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FOREWORD 
This report documents the results of work on underground nuclear 
power plant siting performed between 23 September 1971 and 28 March 1972 by 
the San Bernardino Operations of The Aerospace Corporation. This nine-month 
effort was jointly sponsored by The Aerospace Corporation and the Environmental 
Quality Laboratory (EQL) of the California Institute of Technology. The EQL 
support has been provided through California Institute of Technology Purchase 
Order No. 28-80030-B from Grant No. GI-29726 from the National Science 
Foundation, Research Applied to National Needs (RANN). These joint studies 
are continuing, including the possibility of undergrounding the reactor alone, 
the safety and containment pos sibilities of undergrounding, and the seismic 
implications. 
This work is part of a continuing investigation by the EQL Task 
Force on Novel Methods of Siting Nuclear Power Plants, including underground 
siting, off-shore floating plants, and inland siting. This study of new 
technological alternatives is itself part of a broader investigation of methods 
of providing society with a much wider range of alternatives than it now has 
to cope with the energy demand-supply-environment dilemma. 
Lester Lees 
Director, Environmental 
Quality Laboratory 
August 3, 1972 
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study is part of a larger evaluation of the problems assoc-
iated with siting nuclear power plants in the next few decades. This eval-
uation is being undertaken by the Environmental Quality Laboratory of the 
California Institute of Technology in conjunction with The Aerospace Corpor-
ation and several other organizations. Current efforts are directed toward 
novel approaches to siting plants within the State of California. This report 
contains the results of efforts performed by The Aerospace Corporation to 
provide input information to the larger evaluation relative to underground 
siting of large central station nuclear power plants. 
Projections of electric power demand in California and the 
country as a whole suggest that a major increase in generating capacity 
will be required. The problem is complicated beyond that of a large but 
straightforward extension of capital investment by increased emphasis on 
environmental factors cOlnbined with the early stage of commercial appli-
cation and regulation of nuclear power sources. Hydroelectric power gener-
ation is limited by the availability of suitable sites, and fossil fueled plants 
are constrained by the availability of high quality fuels and the adverse 
environmental and! or economic impact from the use of more plentiful fuels. 
A substantial increase in the number of nuclear power plants is now under 
way. This source of power is expected to provide the maj or portion of in-
creased capacity. Other power sources such as geothermal and nuclear 
fusion are unlikely to satisfy the national needs due to technical problems 
and the lack of a comprehensive development program. 
There are several problems as sociated with meeting the pro-
jected power demand. Chief among these is the location of acceptable 
and economic plant sites. Indeed a sufficient number of sites may not 
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be found unless changes occur in the procedures for selecting sites, the 
criteria for accepting sites, or the type of site required. Placement of a 
nuclear plant underground has been suggested as an alternative to present 
siting practices. It is postulated that the advantages of underground siting 
in Some situations may more than compensate for added costs so that such 
facilities could be preferred even where surface sites are available. By 
virtue of greater safety, reduced surface area requirements, and improved 
aesthetics, underground sites might also be found where acceptable surface 
sites are not available. 
Four small European reactors have been constructed partially 
underground but plans for large size commercial plants have not progressed. 
Consequently, the features of underground power plant siting are not well 
understood. Gross physical features such as depth of burial, number 
and size of excavated galleries, equipment layout, and access or exit 
shafts Itunnels must be specified. Structural design features of the 
gallery liners, containment structure, foundations, and gallery inter-
connections must also be identified. Identification of the nuclear, electrical, 
and support equipment appropriate to underground operation is needed. 
Operational features must be defined for normal operations, refueling, and 
construction. Several magazine articles have been published addres sing 
underground concepts. but adequate engineering data is not available to 
support an evaluation of the underground concept. 
There also remain several unresolved questions relative to 
the advantages of underground siting as well as the costs and other possible 
penalties associated with this novel approach to siting. These include the 
degree of increased safety through improved containment; the extent and 
value of isolation from falling objects, e. g. aircraft; the value of isolation 
from surface storms and tidal waves; the value of protection from vandalism 
or sabotage; the extent by which siting constraints are relieved through re-
duced population-distance requirements or aggravated by underground con-
struction requirements; and the value to be placed upon the aesthetic 
differences of a less visible facility. 
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The study describe d in this report has been directed toward 
some of these questions and uncertainties. Within the study an effort 
has been made to identify viable configurations and structural liners 
for typical light water reactor nuclear power plants. Three configura-
tions are summarized in Section 3. A discussion of the underground 
gallery liner design and associated structural analyses is presented 
in Section 4. Also addressed in the study and discussed in Section 5 
are some aspects of containment for underground plants. There it is 
suggested that the need for large separations between the plant and 
population centers may be significantly reduced, or perhaps eliminated. 
Section 6 contains a brief discussion of operationsl consider-
ations for underground plants. The costs associated with excavation and 
lining of the underground galleries have been estimated in Section 7. These 
estimates include an assessment of variations implied by different seismic 
loading assumptions and differences in geologic media. It is shown that these 
costs are a small percentage of the total cost of comparable surface plants. 
Finally, the parameter s characterizing an acceptable underground site are 
discussed in Section 8. Material is also included in the appendices pertaining 
to foreign underground plants, span limits of underground excavations, po-
tential siting areas for underground plants in the State of California, pertinent 
data from the Underground Nuclear Test Program, and other supporting tech-
nical discussions. 
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SECTION 2 
SUMMARY 
2. 1. STUDY GUIDELINES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Most nuclear power plants now under construction or in the 
planning stage are of the light water type, either boiling water or pres-
surized water. Accordingly, the scope of the present study was limited to 
these types although underground siting may be easily adapted to other 
reactor types. ,;< The size of the plant to be placed underground was selected 
to be approximately 1000 Mwe. This size is representative of large units 
currently available from each of the major manufacturers. It was further 
stipulated that the packaging and configuration of the underground plant 
should not require a major redesign of components in the nuclear steam 
system. This guideline was adopted in an effort to avoid the necessity of 
a major research and development program on new components before 
underground siting might be considered. 
It was also assumed that the entire plant should be under-
ground. There are, of cour se, other configurations in which the turbine 
generator might be left at the surface or in a cut-and-cover pit. Most of 
the underground European plants are of the type where the turbine gener-
ator is at the surface. The limitation of complete burial adopted in this 
study was judgmental and does not represent the result of analyses or 
economic trade studies. 
Another major assumption in the study was that the under-
ground plant would be in close proximity to the ocean or some other large 
body of water and utilize once-through cooling. 
':<For example, the high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) may lend 
itself easily to underground siting. 
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2.2 SUMMARY 
The feasibility of constructing large underground nuclear poviler 
plants is indicated by the partial burial of small European plants and the large 
underground excavations for hydroelectric facilities. The results of this 
study confirm this feasibility. It is also found that substantial improvement 
in containment is a reasonable expectation at many sites. The separation 
distance from the nuclear plant to population center s might well be reduced 
from the 10-20 miles characteristic of comparable surface plants to a small 
localized area. The greater safety implied by this containment might be 
utilized to permit siting closer to load centers or to locate sites where 
alternate surface sites are unavailable. The cost penalty as sociated with 
underground siting is estimated to be less than 10% and perhaps less than 
5% of the total plant cost. 
2.2.1 Configurations and Equipment Packaging 
The equipment associated with typical surface nuclear plants has 
been conceptually placed in four principal underground galleries for both 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) concepts. 
Major redesign of the equipment is not required. The four galleries include 
a reactor gallery (containing the nuclear stearn system), a turbine-generator 
gallery, a nuclear auxiliary gallery (fuel storage, rad waste storage, and 
processing). and a miscellaneous gallery (control room, stand-by Diesels, 
switchgear). Smaller openings are provided as appropriate for transformers 
and control rod drive mechanisms. The spans identified for the reactor and 
turbine -generator galleries, approximately 100 feet, are large. These 
s pan requirements are derived from the assumption that the pres ent surface 
plant equipment will be used without substantial new research and develop-
ment. The Churchill Falls Underground hydroelectric power house in 
Canada, for example, has a span of about 81 feet (s ee Appendix II). Although 
there are many natural openings of much larger spans. established 
excavation practice is limited to the smaller dimensions. The need for 
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large span underground openings implies that sites where good to 
excellent rock quality is found will be strongly preferred. Excavation 
in lesser media is judged feasible but at some cost disadvantage. 
Three different underground plants have been examined. Two 
of these represent the straightforward adaptation of surface PWR and BWR 
plants to the underground site. The third consists of a reconfigured BWR 
plant in which the pressure suppression emergency system typical of most 
surface plants has been eliminated. Elimination of this system significantly 
reduces the volume of excavation and associated costs by utilizing the in-
herent strength of the rock for containment. Further examination of indi-
vidual safety systems may lead to further savings by greater utilization of 
the underground environment. 
2.2.2 Liner s and Depth of Burial 
The large size of the underground openings and concern for 
safety under earthquake loads implies a need for structural liners. For 
flat wall galleries these liners can become quite thick. The thicknesses 
of conventional reinforced concrete liners for horseshoe-shaped gallery 
cros s sections are calculated to be only a few feet. Exact dimensions 
are specified in Section 4 and vary with the gallery dimensions and assumed 
seismic loading. Packaging of the equipment to take advantage of the volume 
provided within the chord of the curved wall was not considered in this effort. 
If this were done a significant reduction in excavated volume could be 
achieved. 
The depth of burial for an underground plant will depend strongly 
upon the properties at the specific site. A minimum depth of 150 to 200 feet 
is indicated for an unlined cavity. This depth should preclude the possibility 
of opening a crack from the pressurization of the cavity following an accident. 
For most rock media this depth of burial should also be consistent with 
nearly complete containment of radioactive leakage within the rock near the 
cavity. 
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2.2.3 Containment 
The containment of radioactive materials following an accidellt 
has been examined for unlined cavities. The reactor galleries included in 
the three underground plant configurations studied were provided with a 
liner as part of the rock support structure. This liner could provide a 
low leakage rate similar to surface PWR plants. Calculations based upon 
the unlined cavity are, therefore, very conservative. 
For many typical rock media the volume and internal surface 
area of the pore space within a few meters of an unlined reactor gallery 
will greatly exceed the volume and surface area of the gallery. Stearn, 
from a ruptured reactor coolant line,. leaking into thes e pores 
will be condensed because of the high heat capacity of the rock. 
Radioactive particulates and halogens should be adsorbed to the pore 
surface leaving only the noble gasses to diffuse to large distances. 
Condensation of the stearn will also result in a drop in pressure and elim-
inate the driving force pushing the gasses through the rock. 
If emergency cooling systems similar to those used in surface 
plants are used underground, pressure in the containment volume should 
also drop to near atmospheric levels after a few tens of minutes following 
an accident. Seepage of radioactive products into the rock would essentially 
stop after this time for lack of a driving force. Simple analyses for dry 
rock conditions indicate that the distance to which products might have 
leaked in this time is small for combinations of permeability and porosity 
of typical rock media. Rocks with large porosity and low permeability 
are particularly effective. The low permeability restricts the flow and 
the large porosity provides a large storage capacity. These analyses further 
imply that little or no release would occur through the rock at the surface 
following an accident. Presuming adequate air locks can be provided to pro-
hibit leakage through entrance and exit shafts or tunnels, the separation 
distance between an underground plant and a large population center can 
be quite small. 
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2.2.4 Costs 
A rough estimate of the cost penalty associated with under-
ground siting has been made based upon 1970-1972 construction costs. 
The principal cost factors are excavation and liners. Figure 2 -1 Sum-
marizes these costs for a site where a good quality rock is found and a 
peak seismic acceleration of 0.5 g is used for the design basis earth-
quake. Current costs for large nuclear power plants are between $200 
and $400 per Kilowatt. The construction costs listed in Figure 2 -1 are 
6 to 9% of the lower figure and half this much for the upper figure. Other 
costs will also be incurred for underground plants. These other costs 
which include such items as operation and maintenance (0 & M) are im-
pos sible to generalize but are felt to be small. Als 0, there ar e cos t 
items that will be credits for an underground plant. For example, 
cost of the containment structure for a surface PWR might be nearly 
$2 million using the same unit costs as were assumed for the under-
ground plants. Since the reactor gallery liner is also the unde rground 
containment structure an additional containment structure is not required. 
Less direct cost advantages might also result by virtue of the 
improved underground containment and closer siting to load centers. This 
would reduce transmission line costs and the cost of capacity required 
to compensate for transmission line losses. These costs are highly de-
pendent upon the specific site selected. The cost of weather protection 
for outdoor turbine generator s used for surface PW R plants would also 
be avoided. Perhaps the most significant cost saving would be that assoc-
iated with the reduced impact of weather during the construction of the plant. 
2.3 RECOMMENDA TrONS 
The following recommendations are made as a result of the 
effort completed in this study. These recommendations are limited 
to those issues judged to be most important to a preliminary evaluation 
of the underground concept and do not constitute a comprehensive list of 
all efforts needed prior to actual construction of an underground plant. 
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2.3. I Priority Is sues Not Included in Pres:ent Study 
a. Seismic Protection 
One of the key is sues in nuclear power plant si ting in 
California today is the approach to aseismic design. This topic was 
not considered in depth as part of the present study due to limitations 
of resources and is recommended as part of future investigations. 
b. HTGR Configurations 
Consideration of power plants using a high tempera-
ture gas cooled reactor, HTGR. nuclear stearn system was omitted as 
part of the ground rules of the present study. This reactor concept 
may have inherent characteristics of improved aseismic design poten-
tial in underground plants. The configuration and costing studies of 
the present effort should be expanded to include the HTGR concept. 
c. Underground Sites 
The characteristics of the underground sites pos tu-
lated in this study are summarized in Section 8. If the underground 
concept is to be pursued, the availability of such sites must be known. 
A map and Ii terature office study complemented by preliminary field 
reconnaissance is recommended. The objective of the study would 
be to locate candidate areas for further study and possible exploration 
rather than pinpoint exact locations for specific si tes. 
2.3.2 Further Investigation of Issues Addressed 
In the Pres ent Study 
a. Containment Analyses 
The containment analyses conducted in the present 
study are highly idealized. These should be expanded to include the 
following: 
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1) The effect of the galle ry liner was not considered. 
Together, the liner and rock constitute a form of double containment. 
Furthermore, extensive analyses of more complex containment models 
are recommended. 
2) The steel liner leakage specifications for the 
reactor gallery may be less demanding as a result of the rock over-
burden. Relaxed leakage specifications for the steel liner should be 
examined to determine whether meaningful cost savings might result. 
3) The containment analyses should also be expanded 
to include more detailed calculations of the thermal balance between 
the escaping products and the rock, the effect of steam condensation, 
and the degree of entrapment of radioactive products in the rock medium. 
4) The potential effectiveness, costs, and procedures 
for tailoring the media properties at a selected site through grouting, 
addition of layers, or other means should be examined. 
5) Practical engineering of an underground contain-
ment system will involve the design and construction of leak-tight 
penetrations and traps. The design requirements for leakage will be 
influenced by the number of penetrations and the total plant configuration. 
Leakage through penetrations was not examined in this study. It is 
recommended that the effect of these penetrations be evaluated and 
included in the containment analysis model. Appropriate design measures 
and analyses to reduce leakage through penetrations should be accom-
plished in future efforts. 
b. Packaging of Plant Equipment 
The packaging of the plant equipment to minimize excava-
tion and liner costs consistent with maintenance access was terminated 
in the present study without iteration. A significant span reduction 
may also be possible. Further repackaging studies are recommended. 
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c. Installation Sequence and Access Sizing 
The installation of large equip:ment ite:ms was not 
investigated in detail although no :major proble:m is anticipated. A 
:more detailed exa:mination of this issue is reco:mrnended to confir:m 
or deny this judg:ment. 
d. Ther:mal Stres s in Liners 
The stress induced in the reactor gallery liner follow-
ing a :maxi:mu:m credible accident and during start-up operations should 
be :more co:mpletely evaluated. 
2.3.3 Other Issues Relating to Underground Construction 
a. Span Li:mits 
The spans identified for the underground galleries of 
this study exceed those of si:milar :man-made excavations. These 
large spans are thought to i:mpact the constructability of the excavation 
pri:marily. Further investigation of the engineering li:mitations i:m-
posed by large spans and the corresponding site selection criteria 
should be conducted. 
b. Liner Loads and Response to Seis:mic Conditions 
The loads to be carried by the gallery liners are 
dependent on the rock quality, seis:mic conditions and gallery con-
figuration. The present study adopted an extre:mely si:mple static 
loads :model. A refined :model should be developed that :more 
accurately reflects rock quality and includes dyna:mic loads i:mposed 
by typical seis:mic conditions. This funda:mental rock :mechanics 
issue should eventually include testing and will provide broad bene-
fits beyond unde rground nuclear power plants. 
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c. Power Distribution From. Underground Sites 
The problem. of distributing the electrical energy 
generated in an underground plant was considered only superficially 
in the present study. This engineering problem. should be investi-
gated further to assure no m.ajor com.plications have been overlooked. 
2.3.4 Studies Outside the Scope of the Present Effort 
a. Alternate Configurations 
Judgm.ent was used to establish the burial guidelines 
of the present study. These guidelines exclude plant configurations in 
which som.e of the equipm.ent is left at the surface or in cut-and-cover 
excavations. These alternatives should be investigated. 
b. Advanced Reactor Concepts 
The advantages of underground siting m.ay be m.ore 
significant or attracti ve for advanced reactor concepts such as 
breeders. The siting issues and potential for underground siting of 
such plants should be exam.ined. 
c. Inland Underground Siting 
The present study considered only those sites where 
once .. through cooling dould be accom.plished. The siting of underground 
plants at inland sites where other form.s of cooling are required should 
also be investigated. 
d. Specific Site Point Design 
The prelim.inary exam.ination of selected issues in the 
present study leaves m.any questions unanswered. At som.e point in 
the future it m.ay be desirable to undertake a com.prehensive pre-
lim.inary design of a specific plant type at a selected site. Such an 
effort would greatly enhance understanding of the technical and 
engineering issues of underground power plant siting and provide a 
m.ore substantive basis for projecting costs and schedules. 
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e. Multiple Plant Sites 
The siting of several plants and supporting facilities 
at a single location should be investigated. This might include the 
power park concept in which fundamental questions relating to the 
functions (e. g., degree of fuel processing) to be included at the 
park should be examined. 
f. Underground Pumped Storage Plants 
The development of underground sites to include 
pumped storage facilities has been proposed. This concept may 
have merit and is recommended for further evaluation. 
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SECTION 3 
UNDERGROUND CONFIGURATION AND LA YOUTS 
The feasibility of constructing large underground nuclear 
power plants is not seriously questioned. In fact, several small plants 
have been built partially underground (see Appendix 1). However, the 
practicality and desirability of constructing large plants is not established. 
An evaluation of the practicality or desirability of such plants must be 
based upon a reasonable understanding of how they might be designed 
and configured. This section summarizes three configurations developed 
to be consistent with the rather stringent study guidelines described 
in Section 2.2. The three configurations include straight-forward 
adaptations of a surface pressurized water reactor system, a boiling water 
reactor system, and a reconfigured boiling water reactor system in which 
the pressure suppression containment system typical of surface BWR 
plants has been eliminated. Many other configurations are equally feasible 
and one or more of these might well prove to be preferred. The three 
configurations discus sed here are not optimized but are thought to provide 
a basis for estimating representative costs. They are the product of 
only limited iterations between an initial concept and an evaluation of 
the des ign consequence. It is felt that the se three plant configurations 
provide a basis from which other configurations might be identified and 
from which broad conclusions might be derived pertinent to technical 
issues, site criteria, cost penalties, operational problems, and potential 
safety features. 
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3. 1 APPROACH 
Significant differences exist in the physical dimensions and 
geometries of the principal stearn and power generation components 
of lightwater reactor systems as supplied by the major manufacturers. 
These properties significantly impact the design of an underground 
plant. In order to specifically identify the differences, the design 
documentation for several nuclear plants uSing boiling water or pres-
surized water nuclear stearn systems was reviewed. 
As a ground rule it was decided that the lias is" manufactured 
shape and dimensions of the nuclear stearn system (NSS) and turbine 
generator (TG) be retained in the underground plant design thereby 
insuring that the operation and performance of the plant would closely 
approximate that of a surface plant. Also, a design goal was adopted 
that the clear span of the underground chambers be limited to les s than 
100 feet and preferably to 60 feet for the most critical chambers. Both 
of these dimensions represent judgments influenced by current under-
ground construction practice and are not the result of some physical 
or engineering limit. The limited span goal together with the as-is 
equipment ground rule caused some difficulty in developing reactor 
chamber designs. This difficulty and its resolution are discussed in a 
subsequent section. 
The most apparent advantage for underground power plant 
siting is greater safety through improved containment. This objective 
can probably be met without the need to bury the entire plant. As is 
the case for several European plants of much smaller size than consid-
ered in this study, the reactor and other nuclear systems might be 
placed underground with the turbine generator, control room, and 
miscellaneous support facilities at the surface. However, additional 
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benefits may be obtained in addition to improved containment if the 
entire plant is underground. Objectionable use of ocean front land 
for the surface facilities would be eliminated. A plant could be placed 
further inland with lesser likelihood of aesthetic land use objections at 
the expense of longer cooling water tunnels. In most locales an inland 
site with a surface turbine would require several hundreds of feet 
separation in elevation between the reactor and the turbine or a need 
to pump cooling water through a similar head. The large reactor-
turbine separation would result in some loss in plant efficiency due to 
the increased length of the steam lines. A surface turbine generator or 
other surface facilities would also be exposed to the elements including 
tornadoes and tsunamiis and potential accidents such as air crashes. 
For these reasons the entire plant was placed underground for all 
three configurations defined. Costs for some combined surface and 
subsurface plant configurations may be estimated by noting the costs 
associated with each underground gallery, Figure 2 -1. A further 
examination of such plants was not included in the present study. 
Many problems with varying degrees of difficulty are 
encountered in the formulation of a plant configuration with trade -off 
of many issues required. Not all of the work so defined could be treated 
to the depth desired. Therefore, it was necessary to treat the various 
issues on a priority basis as time and resources permitted and to select 
approaches to some issues only on the basis of judgment. Some of the 
is sues raised during the study but not treated in depth were: 
a. The Number of Underground Galleries 
It is conceivable that the entire plant could be placed 
in a single large galle ry or in several smaller galleries. The large 
gallery would probably be very long since large spans would impose 
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unreasonable siting requirements or construction problems. The 
need for personnel access to the turbine generator, auxiliary equip-
ment, miscellaneous support equipment, and the control room during 
normal operations and following an accident dictates agains t the 
single gallery concept. The partition of equipment into four major 
galleries was derived from an examination of surface plants. The 
potential for venting the reactor to one or more of the other galleries 
to minimize internal temperatures and pressures was not considered. 
The capability of the rock medium to contain the pressures and 
temperatures in the reactor galle ry alone appears to be qui te ade-
quate and the contamination of larger volumes was, therefore, felt 
to be unnecessary. 
b. The Separation and Orientation of Underground Galleries 
The required separation of large underground cavities 
is highly dependent on the rock medium. Current civil practice 
typically indicates a separation of perhaps one-fourth to one-half 
the span of the largest gallery. Military excavations utilize larger 
separations because of the much larger stress levels anticipated at 
structures subjected to nuclear attack. The separations adapted in 
this study are larger than many civil projects but slightly smaller than 
mili tary considerations dictate. The separations are taken as approxi-
mately twice the gallery span for sizing interconnecting tunnel length 
and are thought to be conservatively large. 
The orientation of the major galleries is such that 
the major axes are parallel. It is assumed that the joint pat tern at 
the site will be such that a preferred orientation is identifiable so 
that large spans can be utilized. 
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No major advantage or disadvantage could be identified 
as to whether all galleries should be at a common elevation or whether 
a stacked orientation would be preferred. There is a desire to keep the 
reactor close to the turbine and the turbine at or near sea level to 
minimize stearn losses and cooling water pump requirements. This 
desire can be satisfied by either a stacked or single elevation layout. 
The single elevation layout was adopted as more closely resembling a 
surface plant. 
c. Plant Electrical Interfaces 
Several electrical interfaces of differing power 
capacities are required for a large nuclear plant. While the lower 
capacity interfaces have stringent electrical reliability requirements, 
for an underground plant the main power output circuit is the more com-
plex and difficult to design. For economic reas ons. the low voltage 
generator output leads are kept as short as practical by transforming 
the generator voltage directly to the transmission voltage level with 
a transformer located near the generator. This is easily achieved in 
the design of surface plants. The reliable transmission of the plant 
electric power usually necessitates that the plant interface electrically 
with the local system grid at a substation. For large plants, the 
electrical interface is complex making the substation large in size; In 
many instances occupying surface areas larger than the plant buildings. 
The placement of a large switch yard at grade near the plant is in-
consistent with the overall underground plant design objecti ves. The 
prospect of using gas insulated bus and switches could reduce the sub-
station size. The placement of all substation equipment underground 
was also considered but incurs an economic penalty which is dependent 
upon transmission requirements rather than generation and as such 
was not studied. The most probable location of the main generator trans-
former is in a separate underground gallery near the generator which 
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is large enough to accOlnnlOdate additional electrical equipment for 
transmission of the circuit to the surface. Several circuit design 
options are available and no unusual problems are expected. 
d. Access Shafts and Ventilation 
The plant layouts include provisions for personnel 
and equipment access into the galleries from the surface. The locations 
and sizes of gallery entrances were established on the basis of plant 
equipment dimensions, the locations of the largest single equipment 
pieces, and the anticipated entrance needs of plant operating personnel. 
The main personnel access to the control room was thought best to be 
a shaft with an elevator. This would provide speedy and safe access 
to the control center area. A tunnel would provide the most convenient 
entrance for installation of large and heavy plant machinery. A tunnel 
entrance of 30 foot diameter would permi t the handling of the largest 
pieces with existing transporters and eliminate some of the handling 
of turbine generator equipment within the gallery if installed through 
a shaft. The use of a shaft as an equipment entrance would present 
a significant departure in heavy equipment handling experience. A 
large capacity crane (200-600 tons) with a long hook reach would have 
to be specially manufactured and installed for each site. Several other 
shafts or tunnels are required to provide for air ventilation; emergency 
personnel escape; electric power, water, waste; fuel handling; and 
safety valve stearn exhaust. The selection of shafts and tunnels or 
both is obviously dependent upon site location and individual site 
terrain features. An example of a possible configuration as suming all 
shafts as a basis for conservative costing is included in the plant 
layout drawings but is not implied to be optimum for the particular 
layout. 
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3.2 PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR (PWR) PLANT CONFIGURA-
TION 
The 1060 Mwe PWR plant under construction by Pacific Gas 
and Electric Company at Diablo Canyon and the proposed 1100 Mwe unit 
No.2 at San Onofre by Sou,thern California Edison were selected as being 
representative of current design (1969) large size PWR power plants. 
When viewed externally both plants have similar appearances, e. g. , 
each plant has a reactor building in the shape of a large cylinder with 
a diameter of about 140 feet and a height of about 200 feet. Connected to 
the reactor building are two rectangular structures comprising the 
TG building and nuclear auxiliary buildings arranged as shown in Figure 3-l. 
The nuclear stearn system (NSS) components are principally located 
within the reactor building and are functionally identical in each plant 
except in physical geometry. The Diablo Canyon Nuclear Stearn System 
as supplied by Westinghouse is a four (4) primary loop coolant design 
with four stearn generators and pumps. The stearn generators, primary 
coolant pumps,and piping are arranged symmetrically around the reactor 
pressure vessel as shown in Figure 3-2a. The minimum lateral 
dimension of this NSS is 65 feet. The span of an underground cavity to 
contain this system would be in excess of 80 feet. It appears that a 
modification to the NSS as shown in Figure 3-2b could reduce the minimum 
diameter to 59 feet. The San Onofre unit 2 NSS as designed by Combustion 
Engineering (CE) also uses a four-loop primary coolant system as 
shown in Figure 3-3. However, this system uses only two larger sized 
stearn generators. The maximum diameter of the Combustion Engineering 
(CE) NSS is about 54 feet. Because of a shorter chamber span require-
ment, the CE NSS was selected as a baseline design for the underground 
plant NSS layout. Data on the geometry of the Babcock and Wilcox NSS 
was examined and found to be similar to the CE NSS system design. 
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After some consideration for the space required for reactor 
refueling, maintenance, equipment installation, access for replacement, 
and the incorporation of current engineered safety systems, it was esti-
mated that a 3300 Mwt (1000 Mwe) PWR nuclear steam system could 
be installed in a chamber with a 60 foot span as shown in Figure 3-4a. 
The NSS chamber length would be 120 feet. A height of 135 feet would be 
provided to include clearance for a large bridge crane to handle heavy 
components. Design of the NSS foundations can be accomplished in several 
ways as influenced by considerations for seismic motion isolation. 
One method would be to utilize the rock as a natural foundation material, 
as shown in Figure 3-4b. The rock chamber is excavated and the equip-
ment grout plate mounted directly to the rock floor. Another method 
is to excavate the entire chamber and construct a concrete foundation 
similar to the surface plant. 
The emergency core cooling and containment spray pumps 
and valves located immediately external to the reactor containment 
structure for surface plants are located in the Nuclear Auxiliary (NA) 
chamber. This NA chamber is sized to contain all equipment, except 
liquid rad waste storage tanks, now found in the auxiliary building of 
surface plants. The stack typically used by surface plants to discharge 
gaseous waste has been replaced by a rad waste disposal system such as 
the freon cryogenic system currently being developed by the AEC. To 
accommodate the additional waste disposal equipment, a 5% increase 
in size was added to the NA building. A departure from surface plant 
design is the required increase in length by about 50 to 100 feet of the 
fuel transfer tube between the reactor and spent fuel pit located in 
the NA chamber. 
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The turbine generator (TG) chamber is the largest single 
excavation of this plant. The TG chamber dimensions are 355 feet 
long, 90 feet wide, and 100 feet high. Forty feet of the length is for 
acces s and maintenance space. The minimum chamber span of 90 
feet is determined by the turbine foundation width and the low pressure 
stage stearn connections. In addition to the turbine and generator, 
the interstage moisture separator and stearn reheater valves and piping 
are located above the turbine floor next to the turbine. It is expected 
that this area will be somewhat crowded with all equipment in place and 
somewhat greater width would be desirable to achieve less dense 
packaging. Connections to the turbine condenser and other miscel-
laneous equipment are located below the turbine floor. The location of 
the several feed water heaters and fresh water condensers has been 
moved from the TG chamber and located in separate chambers (see 
Figure 3-5) adjacent to the TG chamber. 
The remaining plant equipment including all emergency 
power sources, switch gear, refueling water, and condensate make-up 
are contained within the miscellaneous equipment chamber. A sample 
layout of the plant is shown in Figure 3-9 of Section 3. 5. 
3.3 MINIMUM MODIFIED BOILING WATER REACTOR (BWR) 
CONFIGURATION 
The BWR Nuclear Stearn System departs significantly in 
physical size and configuration from the PWR system. Of the two, the 
B WR NSS is smaller in size and more compact although the reactor 
pressure vessel itself is larger. The reduction in overall size is achieved 
through elimination of the steam generator and interconnecting primary 
loop pumps and piping of the PWR. Principal connections to the BWR 
pressure vessel include the feed water intake, steam lines, and core 
water recirculation pump lines. The recirculation pumps are mounted 
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Figure 3-5. Turbine-Generator Chamber (Typical) 
along side the pressure vessel at the base. In plan, the reactor precssure 
ves sel is symmetrical and including all attachments has a maximum 
diameter of about 50 feet in a plane through the level of the recirculation 
pumps. 
Historically, the development of the B WR NSS has included 
the development of a pressure suppression containment. This contain-
ment has been evolving toward greater plant energy density with lower 
construction costs. Beginning with the Dresden I plant the containment 
design began as a sphere, then evolved into a cylinder, then to the 
inverted light bulb shaped drywell and torus and more recently the over/ 
under designs typical of the Limmeric and Zimmer plants. The various 
phases of containment development are illustrated in Figure 3 - 6. From 
an inspection of Figure 3-6 it is apparent that the minimum width of these 
BWR NSS containment designs exceed the 60 foot chamber span design 
goal. After rejecting several alternative methods the design of Figure 
3-7 with a span of 75 feet was selected. The design uses the inverted 
light bulb shaped drywell design with dimensions estimated from the Quad 
Cities and Brown's Ferry plants. The design shown in Figure 3-7 
includes a reconfiguration of the toroidal suppression pool storage tanks 
and drywell interconnecting piping. The equipment within the surface 
plant reactor building would be retained but reorientated to fit the shape 
of the underground BWR NSS gallery. 
A significant difference between the B WR and PWR chamber 
designs described above is the elimination of the BWR gallery leak-
tight steel liner since only the drywell and suppression tanks are exposed 
to the accident pressure transient. 
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Figure 3-6. Evolution in BWR Plant Design 
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The turbine generator, nuclear auxiliaries, and miscellaneous 
equipment galleries comprise the remainder of the plant. The TG 
used as a basis for chamber sizing was a General Electric design. 
Examination of the G. E. design concluded that the turbine could be placed 
in an 80 foot wide chamber if the turbine radiation shield were eliminated. 
With shielding, the chamber would be 100 feet wide at the turbine floor. 
The BWR TG chamber is longer than the PWR TG chamber (415 feet) to 
accommodate items peculiar to the BWR plant. Feed water heaters and 
fresh water condensers are located in a smaller chamber adjacent to 
the TG chamber. 
3.4 RECONFIGURED BWR PLANT CONFIGURATION 
The reconfigured BWR plant was developed in an effort to 
make greater use of the surrounding rock consistent with present reactor 
systems. The layout as shown in Figure 3-8 would place the reactor in 
a lined vertical cylinder excavated in the rock. The cylinder would be 
about 65 feet in diameter. An excavated chamber would extend above the 
reactor high enough to accommodate the handling of equipment and reactor 
shields with a large crane. The chamber width would extend to the dia-
meter of the reactor excavation and of sufficient length for a refueling 
channel. Separation of the refueling channel and drywell would be with 
a seal between the rock excavation and the reactor pressure vessel. 
Acces s to the drywell for equipment repair and inspection would be 
accomplished through a shaft along side the pressure vessel excavation. 
The construction of this NSS would include a steel liner similar to the 
PWR plant. 
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Separate galleries adjacent to the reactor gallery contain the 
control rod drive and emergency core cooling pump equipment. Reactor 
emergency cooling water is supplied from storage tanks located in the 
nuclear auxiliary gallery. Although the increase in size of the nuclear 
auxiliary gallery partly offsets the reduction in size of the reactor 
gallery, the smaller reactor gallery is thought to be a significant 
improvement over the minimum modified BWR plant configuration. 
The remaining portion of the plant would have nearly the 
same layout and dimensions as the minimum modified BWR described 
in Section 3. 3. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
The foregoing configuration descriptions present layouts for 
three underground reactor power plants, two of which are BWR plants 
and one a PWR plant. Each plant consists of several chambers which 
contain the various equipment of the plant. The significant features of 
the plants are that they use current designs for the principal components 
of the nuclear steam system and turbine generator. Improved radio-
active waste collection and retention systems have been assumed to be 
part of the nuclear auxiliary facilities to eliminate the necessity for 
a plant stack. Retention of the emergency safety systems, par,ticularly 
those used to reduce post accident containment chamber pressure and 
radioactivity implies a very conservative approach to safety since burial 
may reduce the need for some of these features by virtue of the con-
tainment provided by the rock. This subject is discussed in Section 5 
of this report. A summary of the dimensional data for each of the three 
plant chamber layouts is given in Table 3-1. 
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TABLE 3-1 
NUCLEAR PLANT GALLERY MINIMUM REQUIRED EXCAVATION DIMENSIONS 
(HI X WI xLI) 
Chamber BWR BWR (Minimum Mod) Reconfigured 
Reactor 180 x 75x215 145 x 65 x 155 
Control (2) 
- - - 40 x 30 x 50 
Nuclear Aux. 90 x 50 x 155 90 x 50 x 255 
Turbine Generator>:< 100 x 100 x 415 100 x 100 x 415 
Feed Water Heaters (2) 45 x 40 x 50 45 x 40 x 50 
Miscellaneous 30 x 60 x 120 30 x 60 x 120 
(excludes Control Room) 
_ ....... _- ... __ ...... -
- -- ---- L- - ... _- -
-'-
-.- Includes 40 feet of gallery length for construction and maintenance 
PWR 
135 x 60 x 120 
lOx 10 x 30 
90 x 50 x 260 
100 x 90 x 355 
45 x 40 x 50 
30 x 60 x 120 
The excavation dimensions are gallery sizes defined above 
and influenced by dimensions of the structural liner. As shown in 
Section 4 the roof and wall structure may include an arch design and 
that the height of the arch would be additive to the clear span dimensions 
of Table 3 -1. The additional volume provided by the curved wall and 
roof liners could be utilized to achieve a further economy in plant 
packaging. Iteration of the plant packaging to make use of this volume was 
not possible in this study. Further packaging studies of this type are 
expected to reduce the cost of underground siting and are recommended 
as part of future study efforts. As indicated in Section 3. 1, no factors 
were identified to specify the number or orientation of underground 
galleries. Peculiarities at a particular site will more than likely 
dominate selection of the layout. Figure 3 - 9 was constructed to 
illustrate one possible layout wherein only a single level is used and large 
intergallery rib spacing is provided. This figure indicates that the total 
plant would be included in a 700 by 700 foot area of approximately 
11 acres exclusive of cooling water conduits and headworks. The 
geologic medium containing the plant would be slightly larger. Since a 
conservatively large intergallery rib spacing was assumed it may be 
possible to reduce these dimensions without the need to use a stacked 
configuration. 
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SECTION 4 
ENGINEERING ANA LYSES 
Several engineering analyses were performed to further 
define the plant configurations discussed in Section 3. Early studies 
were completed to identify the depths of burial that might be dictated 
by structural cons ide rations. Subsequent studies of the seepage of 
fluids through the rock indicate that similar depths are probably 
more than adequate to provide excellent containment. Although the 
structural analys es we re highly idealized. the resulting depths 
are not large and a reexamination of the analyses was not made to 
determine a more precise minimum depth. 
The bulk of the analyses conducted was directed toward 
the definition of the gallery liners as dictated by the quality of the 
rock medium at the site and the design basis seismic loads. This 
work included a large number of parametric variations and resulted 
in a decision to adopt a horseshoe cross sectional shape rather than 
the flat wall and arch typical of most underground hydroelectric 
excavations. 
It was originally planned to address the relative response 
of underground and surface plants to seismic loading conditions. 
Unfortunately, the limited resources and time available for the study 
did not permit these investigations to be completed. This subject 
continues to be of great interest and is recommended to be included 
in subsequent studies. 
4.1 DEPTH OF BURIAL 
One of the potential advantages of placing a nuclear plant 
underground is the increased containment of radioactive materials 
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afforded by the medium. Aboveground plants are equipped with 
secondary containments of either concrete or steel which provide 
a passive barrier to atmospheric dispersal of radioactive material 
in the event of an accident. For a plant sited below ground, the 
rock affords an additional barrier. However, for the rock to be 
effective the depth of burial must be sufficient to prevent cracks 
from opening to the surface under the influence of increased cavity 
pressures following a reactor coolant loop break accident. 
To estimate the required depth of burial, a study was 
made of the distribution of rock stress between an unlined cavity and 
the surface for various cavity pressures. The stres ses resulting 
from lithostatic and cavity pressure loads were calculated for both 
spherical and cylindrical cavities using the closed form solutions 
from elastic theory. These equations are recorded in Appendix 1. 
The distribution of tangential stress above a pressurized 
cylindrical cavity is shown in Figure 4-1. The net tangential stres s. 
O'e' obtained by combining the lithostatic and internal pressure 
components, varies between the cavity and surface from tension to 
compression and back to tension. Due to the low and unpredictable 
tensile strength of most rock media, one should expect that cracks 
will open wherever a tensile stress exists. A crack extending between 
an unlined cavity and surface would allow direct flow to the atmosphere 
and constitute failure of the rock containment. This condition is 
as sumed to exist if all points along the critical section directly above 
the cavity are in tension. 
Calculations were made to determine the minimum depth 
of burial as a function of cavity pres sure. The pres ence of 
tensile stresses at all points (i. e .• 0' 8
p 
+ 0' e i < 0) directly above the 
cavity as the criterion for containment. The results are presented in 
Figures 4-2 and 4-3 for cylindrical and spherical cavities, respectively. 
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An important parameter influencing the required depth 
of burial is Poisson's ratio. This sensitivity is shown in Figure 4-4. 
For good rock, in situ horizontal and vertical stress measurements 
indicate an effective Poisson's ratio of between 0.3 and 0.4 even 
though laboratory tests on small specimens indicate lower values. 
Accordingly, a Poisson's ratio of 0.3 was used in Figures 4-2 and 4-3. 
The change in stress with variations in cavity pressure 
is shown on Figure 4-5 for a 40 foot radius cylindrical cavity buried 
120 feet. At cavity pressures of 93 psig or greater, a crack may 
extend to the surface as the stress is tensile at all points directly 
above the opening. 
The size of the reactor cavities in good to excellent rock 
media identified in this study varied in span between 83 feet and 102 feet. 
Peak internal pressures were estimated to be between 74 psig and 58 psig, 
respectively. As can be seen from Figures 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 a depth 
of cover of 80 to 130 feet should be adequate for structural containment 
without a margin of safety. The inclusion of a reasonable safety factor 
suggests depths of cover of 150 to 200 feet. 
4.2 STRUCTURAL DESIGN 
An investigation was made to determine the influence of 
site characte ristics, system configuration, and structural parameters 
on the design of liners for underground power plant openings. Several 
liner concepts were examined. Special attention was given to the 
reactor systems gallery. The design sensitivity to geometry. rock 
quality, seismic loading, construction material properties and reactor 
accident environment were established. 
4.2.1 Liner Concepts 
The liner concepts shown in Figure 4-6 were considered. 
Included are liners constructed of reinforced concrete with a non-
structural inner plate (leak protection), composite steel and conc rete 
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RIB AND POST 
and steel ribs and posts. Reinforced concrete was found to be 
adequate for this application. The large size sections required for 
the rib and post design made it an impractical choice. The com-
posite steel and concrete design was more than adequate from a 
structural standpoint. 
Not explicitly identified in Figure 4-6 is a provision to 
allow water to drain around the structure to a sump volume. This pro-
vision is desirable to avoid designing the leak-tight underground 
structure as a pressure hUll capable of withstanding a hydrostatic head. 
Drainage could be provided by installing a porous layer between the 
concrete and rock or installing drainage channels or pipes. The 
porous layer might consist of a thin layer of gravel, or porous con-
crete. The drainage channels might consist of drain tiles, perforated 
pipes, or a layer of corrugated steel adjacent to the rock. A sump 
storage volume would be provided for the drain water which would be 
expected to be contaminated following an accident. During normal 
operation this drainage would be monitored and pumped out of the 
facility. The influx of water around the reactor gallery could effectively 
prevent radioactive product seepage beyond the immediate area of the 
reactor gallery. The need for the water drainage provision including the 
calcification and potential clogging of drainage pas sages is recognized as 
a potential problem area that should be examined in future studies. 
4.2.2 Analysis Methodology and Loads Determination 
Working stress design principles as outlined in ACI Code 
318-63, Reference 4-1, were selected for si:,-;ing the liners to be con-
sistent with recommended practice (Reference 4-2) for containment 
structure design. The inner steel liner used in the containments was not 
considered to contribute to load carrying capability of the structure in 
keeping with the recommendations of Reference 4-2. 
The loads as sumed to be acting on the liner were: 
a. Structure dead load. 
b. Rock load dependent on rock quality. 
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c. Seismic amplification of above loads varying from 
1. 0 to 1. 75 for roof segments and 0 to O. 75 for wall 
segments. 
The pressure internal to the containment structure which might 
accompany a reactor accident was not included due to its transient 
nature. Final design calculations should take into account the time 
variation of seismic, temperature and internal pressure loadings, 
as well as site peculiar conditions. However, the foregoing assump-
tions are considered sufficiently accurate to identify the importance 
of various design parameters and are consistent with the characteri-
zation of a generalized site. 
4.2.3 Liner Designs and Sensitivities 
A horseshoe shaped containment, as shown in Figure 4-7, 
was chosen for parametric analyses. The results are shown in 
Figures 4-8 through 4-19. The minimum required arch thickness is 
the dependent variable on each graph. The seve ral scale s shown along 
the ordinate are described below. Figures 4-8 through 4-11 are for 
roof arches. They indicate the variation of required arch thickness 
as a function of rock quality, seismic load. rise to span ratio, and 
span in that order. Figures 4-12 through 4-15 provide the same 
information for the walls. The last three figures show the variation 
in thickness for different concrete and steel strengths and percentages 
of reinforcing steel. Figure 4-19 compares the thickness required of 
flat walls with parabolic arch walls. The thicknes s neces sary to resist 
the rock seismic loads for flat walls make their use impractical even 
in excellent rock and lead to adoption of horseshoe-shaped structures 
consisting of parabolic arch segments. 
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Figure 4-15. Parabolic Arch Wall Span vs Thickness 
4 - 14 
*'" 
...... 
U1 
.~ 
" P-
5~ 000 
4,000 
i 3,000 
f-t (J 
Z 
~ 
0:: 
f-t 
[fJ 2,000 
~ 
f-t 
~ 
0:: 
U 
Z 
o 
U 1,000 
o 
01= 0.25-' 01 = o. 5-' 01 = O. 75-' 01 = 1. ()-l 
L 60 it 
LiT 0° 
R 1/8 
G 0.75 
P
t 
0.04 
f 60,000 psi y 
10 20 30 40 50 
THICKNESS, in 
Figure 4-16. Parabolic Arch Roof 
Concrete Strength vs Thickness 
4 
3 
I \ \ \ 
60 it 
;€ 
\ \ \ \ /.l~ _ 0° - R 1/8 ...:I ~ G 0.75 ~ f-t f 60,000 psi [fJ y (J I 4, 000 psi Z f -
G 2 0:: 
0 
1>. 
~ 
~ 
0:: 
...:I 
.;: 
f-t 
0 
f-t 
a= o. Z5 01=0.5 
o I~ ______ ~ ________ ~ ________ L-______ -d ________ ~ 
o 20 40 60 80 100 
THICKNESS, in. 
Figure 4-17. Parabolic Arch Roof 
Reinforcing Percentage vs Thickness 
60 
<Jl 
.>: 
:r: 
f-< 
lJ 
Z 40 
~ 
r:r; 01=0.75 f-< 
Ul 
(:1 
.-1 
f:l 
~ L 60 ft 
.-1 JT 0° r.l 
~ R 1/8 f-< 
Ul G 0.75 ~ 20 P
t 
0.04 
U 
r:r; I 4,000 psi 0 f 
f.,.; c 
Z 
i;J 
r:r; 
0 0 L------~1~0------~2~0------~3~0------~4~0--------~50--------~60 
THICKNESS, in. 
Figure 4-18. Parabolic Arch Roof Steel Yield Strength vs Thickness 
RQD CJ. 
75 1. 0 
80 
0.75 
85 
O. 50 
90 
0.25 
95 ARCH FLAT WALL 
100 0 
a 40 80 120 160 zoo 
THICKNESS, in. 
Figure 4-19. Arch vs Flat Wall 
4 - 16 
Figure 4- 8 indicate s the variation in arch thickne s s as 
a function of rock quality. The two scales used to characterize 
the ITledia are a and RQD. The paraITleter, a. is taken froITl 
the Terzaghi classification systeITl. Reference 4-3. It is a factor 
that when ITlultiplied by the arch span deterITlines the aITlount of 
rock the structure ITlust be designed to support. In other 
words, a thickness of rock equal to a tiITles the span ITlust be 
supported by the structure. The joint spacing scale is self-explana-
tory. The RQD classification systeITl, Reference 4-4, is based on 
exaITlining c ore borings. An RQD is obtained by ITleasuring the total 
length of all unweathered pieces of core greater than 4 inches and 
dividing by the total length of the core. The result is expressed as 
a percentage. A qualitative description of the rock for various RQD 
ratings is given in Table 4-1. The curves indicate that the required 
thickness of the arch is reasonable throughout the range of RQDs 
froITl 75 to 100 percent. 
Table 4-1 
ROCK QUALITY CLASSIFICATION 
RQD (%) Rock Quality 
o - 25 Very Poor 
25 - 50 Poor 
50 - 75 Fair 
75 - 90 Good 
90 - 100 Excellent 
Figure 4-9 indicates the variation in arch thickness as a 
function of seisITlic loading. Results are presented for a range froITl 
25% g to 75% g and for rock qualities (a) of 0.25 to 1. O. FroITl these 
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results, it is apparent that the structural requirements are not 
particularly sensitive to variations in inertia loads within this range. 
This analysis does not account for differential movement of the rock 
such as might occur at a fault or major discontinuity during an earth-
quake. The latter would, of course, rupture any structure placed in 
direct contact with the rock. 
Figure 4-10 shows the influence of the curvature of the 
arch. The results indicate rise to span ratios of 3/16 or greater 
are preferred. However, there is another factor to be considered 
in selecting the rise to span ratio which is not evident in Figure 4-10. 
As the ratio inc reases, the required structure thicknes s is reduced, 
but at the same time the opening bec orne s more bulbous requiring a 
larger excavation. The increase in excavation cost may offset the 
savings in liner costs. This was the case in the baseline structure 
designs discussed in Section 7.0 where a rise to span ratio of 1/8 
was ultimately chosen. 
Figure 4-11 illustrates the sensitivity of the structure 
thickness to span or opening size. It is seen that for spans of interest, 
the variation is nearly linear and the thickness is rather sensitive to 
this parameter. There are. of course. bounds on the opening size 
which are not apparent ,from the figure. Appendix II discusses this 
issue. 
Figures 4-12 through 4-15 present the same information 
for arch walls as shown for the roof in Figures 4-8 through 4-11. 
The increased arch span makes the required thickness somewhat more 
sensitive to each of the parameters, but does not change the character 
of the sensitivity. 
Figures 4-16,4-17 and 4-18 show design sensitivity to 
concrete strength, steel yield strength and percentage of reinforcing 
steel. The des igns do not appear particularly sens itive to material 
strengths or the amount of steel over normal ranges for these variables. 
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4.2.4 TherTI1al Stress 
The foregoing paraTI1eter sensitivity curves did not include 
the effect of teTI1perature induced stresses. Following a loss of 
coolant accident, the teTI1perature within the containTI1ent could rise 
o 
to between 275 and 325 F. The resulting stress distribution across 
the containTI1ent wall is shown in Figure 4-20 for a peak containTI1ent 
o 
teTI1perature of 325 F. These stress distributions are based on the 
assuTI1ption that the liner is prevented froTI1 lateral extension by the 
surrounding rock. This is a conservative assuTI1ption in that the in 
situ rock, while adTI1ittedly stiff, is nonetheless cOTI1pressible. Exten-
sion of the arch through cOTI1pressing the surrounding rock would relieve 
s OTI1e of the stre s s. 
Referring to Figure 4-20, lOO sec onds after an accident, a 
stres s of approxiTI1ately 6000 psi is reached in the first inch or so of 
the liner. This stress level is in excess of the unconfined cOTI1pressive 
strength of the concrete, assuTI1ing the use of 4000 psi, 28 day strength 
concrete. This TI1ay lead to SOTI1e degradation of the first inch of thick-
ness which is not sufficient to affect the liner's structural integrity. 
At later tiTI1es, the rise in teTI1perature and stress will progress toward 
the outer surface. However, the peak stress levels are reduced to 
within the unconfined cOTI1pressive strength capability of the concrete. 
No adverse effect is expected, even though this idealized analysis 
indicates stresses in excess of the working stress allowab1es. 
The foregoing results are based on a first order approxi-
TI1ation of the therTI1a1 stress distribution. Since high stress levels are 
indicated, a TI10re detailed analysis is justified. NUTI1erica1 finite e1eTI1ent 
analysis TI1ethods are well suited to prob1eTI1S of this s art, and their use 
should be cons ide re d in future inve s tiga ti ons . 
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Figure 4-20. Thermal Stress Distribution Across Containment Wall 
4.2.5 Baseline Structure Design 
Liners were sized for each excavated gallery of the three 
plant configurations discussed in Section 3 to provide a basis for 
costing. In keeping with the AEC classification according to the 
degree of seismic protection to be provided, two classes of structures 
were considered as follows ~ 
a. Class I--Those structures required to prevent 
uncontrolled release of radioactivity and those 
neces sary to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown 
condition. 
b. Class II--Those structures required for continuity 
of power generation but not essential to safe shutdown 
and is olation of the reactor and whose failure could 
not result in the release of substantial amounts of 
radioactivity. 
The dimensions and c las s as signments for each gallery are summarized 
in Appendix VI. The reactor gallery, nuclear auxiliary gallery, and 
miscellaneous-control gallery were designated Class I and the turbine-
generator gallery Class II. For designation of the smaller excavations 
see Appendix VI. Class I and Class II structures were designed to with-
stand earthquake inertia loadings of 500/0 g and 250/0 g, respectively, in a 
horizontal direction and 2/3 of these levels vertically. The other baseline 
design parameters were: 
Rock Quality, RQD 
Rock Load Factor, a. 
Concrete Strength, f I 
c 
Steel Yield Strength, f y 
Reinforcing Percentage, P
t 
Arch Rise to Span Ratio, R 
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80 to 85 
o. 5 
4000 psi 
60,000 psi 
10/0 
1/8 
The cost of excavation and structural liners for the baseline plant 
layouts was calculated and is provided together with other cost in-
for:mation in Section 7. o. 
4.2.6 Structure Summary 
The structures for underground plants in good to excellent 
rock media require reinforced concrete wall thicknesses up to five feet 
for the larger openings. Siting in poor rock media will result in very_ 
thick walls (up to 25 feet) and will probably result in construction 
difficulties for large span galleries. The use of horseshoe shaped 
openings is preferred rather than the more common arch roof and 
flat walled construction found in mos t hydroelectric plants. The re-
quirement to design for earthquake inertia loads leads to this selection. 
The inertia loads are not the only pos sible earthquake effect influenc-
ing liner design. Rock fracture and differential movement, should it 
occur, would present a problem. A crushable backpacking material 
might be used if it were necessary to accommodate such conditions. The 
likelihood of a virgin fault opening where a fault had not previously 
existed is believed to be remote. With proper siting precautions the need 
to design for differential rock motion can be avoided. Finally, the 
temperature differentials following an accident might result in high 
stresses and, while thes.e are not expected to affect the liner's 
structural integrity. they should be examined mOre thoroughly. 
4.3 SEISMIC ANALYSES 
A careful evaluation of the seismic implications of under-
ground nuclear power plant siting was hoped to be included as part of 
this initial investigation. Unfortunately, the limited study resources 
and schedule did not permit this effort to be completed. Such an 
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investigation is recommended as part of future efforts. The following 
discussion summarizes the results of preliminary thoughts on the 
subject but are not based on quantitative analyses. 
Pr otection from earthquake loadings is one of the most 
difficult problems in nuclear power plant design and siting. Under-
ground siting does not appear to provide a total solution to this 
problem although the re are several potential advantages that may 
make the problem more tractable. The greater containment provided 
by underground construction suggests the consequences of damage 
following an earthquake may be less severe. This does not in itself 
reduce the probability of an accident. The ability to more rigidly 
support major pieces of equipment from the walls or roof might also 
reduce the amplification of seismic loads expected for surface plants. 
In general. for both surface Or underground plants protection from 
earthquakes may be obtained by selecting a site where the earthquake 
loads are reduced, through special design of equipment to resist 
earthquake loads, by spec ial provision to reduce amplification of 
external loads, and/or by inserting some type of isolation mechanism 
to attenuate the external loads to acceptable levels. All three of 
these approaches are employed in present nuclear plants to varying 
degrees. 
4.3. 1 Seismic Protection- -Motion Attenuation 
The earthquake loading at any site is quite dependent on the 
specific site. Economic factors will tend to limit selection of under-
ground sites to reasonably competent rock masses. The motions ex-
perienced by an underground plant should then be unaffected by the 
amplifications sometimes enc ountered at surface sites placed on soft 
media. The underground site will also be free from the problems 
ass ociated with s oil liquefaction. 
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It has been suggested that the motions occurring at some 
depth below the surface may be less than those at the surface due to 
the attenuation of surface wave amplitudes away from the surface. 
However. since the wave lengths as s ociated with earthquake frequen-
cies are much longer than the probable depths of burial for under-
ground plants, significant attenuations may not be observed. Furthe r-
more, the complex structure of surface waves may include some com-
ponents that peak below the surface. This problem was not quantitatively 
investigated in the present study. 
4.3.2 Seismic Pr otection- - Fault Identification 
In the design of surface nuclear power plants great care 
and expense is taken to identify nearby faults. These faults are 
frequently obscured by surface layers or obstructions. Large differ-
ential motions across a fault running through a nuclear plant presents 
a near impossible design task and such faulted sites must be avoided. 
Construction of an underground plant would be preceded by similar 
extensive ge ologic and ge ophysical investigations. The excavation 
of the underground plant would provide for the detailed direct ins pec-
tion of the geology of the plant site which cannot be accomplished for 
surface sites. If an unknown fault zone were uncovered, the site could 
be abandoned. Where fhe inspection of the rock mass did not reveal 
fault zone s, it is thought safe to as se rt that large differential motions 
from future earthquakes will not occur at the plant site although 
uniform gross motions may be experienced. 
4.3,3 Seismic Protection- -Reduced Amplification and Is olation 
The large mass of critical reactor system equipment and 
the necessity to maintain the integrity of interconnecting lines presents 
a severe shock is olation problem for many reactor systems, This is 
true for both underground and surface plants. In s orne surface plants 
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the amplification of the base motions due to flexure of the equipment 
supports and plant structure can be a factor of two or more. These 
application factors may be reduced by providing more rigid supports 
(increasing the effective frequency of the supporting structure). The 
design of such supports may be simplified in underground plants due 
to the greater access to the base rock of the walls or roof. Some 
reactor systems such as the high temperature gas cooled reactors 
(HTGR) may inherently be more resistant to earthquake accelerations, 
particularly if inc orporated in an underground configuration. 
An alternate to stiffening the ties between the plant equip-
ment and the base rock is the introduction of an isolation system 
(decreasing the frequency of the supporting structure). Underground 
siting of the light water reactor systems considered in the present 
study does not appear to simplify the shock isolation required for 
seismic protection. It is possible that a detailed engineering design 
of shock mounts for individual components or mounts to support a 
large platform containing the reactor steam system could make use 
of the sidewalls and roof for support that would not be practical in 
surface plants. Such designs have not been developed. 
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SECTION 5 
CONTAINMENT ANALYSES 
An attractive feature of underground nuclear power plant siting 
is the potential improvement in the containment of radioactive materials 
in the event of an accident. Present surface nuclear plants must be sited 
at large distance s from population center s. The separation between a 
1000 Mwe plant site and an actual or future population center of 25, 000 
or more people might typically be of the order of 15 to 20 miles. Other 
separation distances apply to lesser population levels. An exclusion area 
in the immediate vicinity of the surface plant must be defined within which 
the public can be excluded and positive control for possible evacuation can 
be maintained. These siting requirements are derived from conservatively 
safe estimates of the worst conditions that could result following a maximum 
credible accident at the power plant coupled with what are thought to be 
conservatively low permis sible radiation dose levels that might be imposed 
upon the public. These large separation distances effectively prohibit met-
ropolitan siting of nuclear plants near load centers and exclude large areas 
from consideration as possible plant sites. 
The large separation distances are dictated by postulated acci-
dent conditions and do not relate to normal operations. Siting of a plant 
underground in some media could result in near total containment of radio-
active materials following an accident and significantly reduce the separ-
ation distances from miles to fractions of a mile, feet, or essentially zero. 
The improved containment would be provided by the earth cover over the 
plant. Several idealized calculations were performed to explore the effect-
iveness of this containment. 
5. I IDEALIZED MODEL RESULTS 
The reactor galleries described in Sections 3 and 4 are pro-
vided with a reinforced concrete and steel liner. This liner would be con-
structed to leak tight specifications similar to the containment structures 
5 - 1 
of surface plants. For purposes of analysis it was decided to initially 
consider an unlined cavity and examine the containment that might be pro-
vided by typical rock media. The presence of the concrete and steel inner 
liner makes this assumption extremely conservative. To the extent that 
this liner is identical with the containment structure of a surface plant, the 
containment provided by the rock medium is an improvement that will de-
crease the required separation distances. The improved containment can 
also be viewed as an additional margin to compensate for unforeseen adverse 
performance of present safety systems. The barrier provided by the rock 
might also be considered as an additional passive safety system. 
For purposes of analysis an unlined spherical cavity with a 
radius of 17 m (approximate volume of the PWR reactor gallery) was adopted. 
This cavity is assumed to be buried in a dry uniform medium characterized 
by a porosity and a permeability. Two types of media are considered correS-
ponding to a granitic medium with low porosity (perhaps O. 10/0) and a sand-
stone or limestone medium with a high porosity (perhaps 15 - 2.00/0). The 
permeability of both media is postulated to be between 1 and 10 millidarcies. 
(A discussion of rock porosity and permeability is contained in Section 5.2. 
and Appendix IV. ) 
The volume of the 17 m cavity is approximately 2. x 104 m 3 and 
the surface area is 4 x 103 m2.. The pore volume in a sphere with twice 
the cavity radius is equal to the cavity volume if the porosity is only 140/0. 
The internal surface area of a medium-fine sandstone such as Bradford 
Sandstone is "'5000 acres/acre-ft; and may reach 30, 000 acres/acre-ft 
in a fine sandstone. Hence, a seepage front at 34 meters will have filtered 
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over ......,2. x 10 m of relatively cool rock surface. The heat capacity of the 
rock is also very large, and will cause the stearn diffusing into the rock to 
condense with a drop in pressure. The particulate materials and the halogens 
will also be cooled and adsorbed in the pore volume very near the cavity. 
Only the noble gases, e. g. Kr-85, will persist in a form that can move 
large distance s through the dry rock medium. 
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To obtain an idea of the seepage rates from the reactor cavity, 
Some simplifying as sumptions were neces sary. A steady state isothermal 
flow is postulated between a spherical cavity and the seepage front. The 
pressure is assumed to drop from the cavity pressure (3 or 5 atmospheres) 
at the cavity surface to 1 atmosphere at the seepage front. Figure 5 -1 shows 
the position of the front as a function of time for several parametric values 
for the cavity pressure, rock porosity, and permeability. It is Seen that 
the time required for the front to move a distance of 60-70 meters (approxi-
mate minimum depth of burial from Section 4) is very long. Most of the 
radioactive gasses that are produced in a reactor have half-lives much less 
than these times and will decay. 1-131, which is probably the most prom-
inent isotope in establishing surface plant separations, has a half-life of 
8. 1 days and would experience significant decay even if it were not trapped 
within the rock pores. Table 5-1 lists several radioactive half-lives for 
fission products. This calculational model greatly overstates the leakage 
problem. The isothermal assumption assumes the rock is at the same 
temperature as the stearn. In reality, the stearn temperature and pressure 
will drop sharply once it moves away from the cavity and the relatively 
cool rock will cause the stearn to condense and the pressure to drop. 
The model further does not allow for condensation of the stearn in 
the reactor cavity and reduction of the cavity pressure. The cavity 
pressure will drop quickly as the emergency cooling systems condense 
the stearn in the reactor cavity. Also. the model does not account 
for the volume of material that is lost from the cavity through seepage. As 
mentioned previously, the pore volume already equals the cavity volume at 
only 2 cavity radii for a material with 14% porosity. The is othermal 
flow rates predicted from the cavity imply that the cavity will be de-
pressurized by volumetric loss before the seepage front reaches the sur-
face. 
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FISSION PRODUCT HALF-LIVES 
Product 
Kr-85 
Kr-87 
Kr-88 
X e -133 
X e -135 
X e -138 
1-131 
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Figure 5-1. Seepage Front Position 
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A drop in the cavity pressure will affect the seepage by effectively 
removing the driving force. When the cavity pressure drops to 1 atmosphere, 
seepage will essentially stop. The steam and radioactive material will then 
be trapped in the rock$ spread over a region roughly extending from the 
cavity to the seepage front. 
The pressure time history in the reactor cavity following a 
maximum credible accident is determined by the rate of release of water 
or steam through the postulated break in the primary loop, the extent of 
chemical interactions (e. g. zirconium-water), the energy generated from 
the core, the volume and heat capacity of the containment structure and 
the emergency cooling systems designed to minimize the temperature and 
pressure. Although the volume of the underground reactor cavity may be 
less than that typically found in surface plants and peak temperatures and 
pressures larger, the duration of the internal pressure pulse should be 
very similar (assuming the same emergency systems). This can be Seen 
by noting that the primary mechanism for reducing the cavity temperature 
and pressure is through injecting large quantities of water rather than by 
heat loss through the air or rock. If the underground systems inject a 
comparable amount of water, the end result should be about the same. 
The pressure-time history for the underground cavity was estimated as 
shown in Figure 5-2. The duration is seen to be approximately 10 3 seconds 
or 17 minutes. The seepage driving force will then terminate after only 
103 seconds which is well before the front has reached the surface. The 
distances the front has moved can be read directly from Figure 5-1 or 
5-2. It is seen that for many media, the seepage front will have progressed 
only a few meter s from the unlined cavity. A large porosity is preferred 
because of the large storage capacity in the rock. This model implies that 
no material will be released to the atmosphere and complete containment 
will be achieved. 
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Further advance of the radioactivity beyond the seepage front can take place 
only by diffusion of the radioactive gases through the stagnant air in the pores of 
the enclosing rock. In this case, transport is caused by concentration gradients 
rather than pressure gradients, and is very slow in cotnparison with the connective 
flow rates considered above. Diffusion is a "randotn-walk" process, and it is 
characteristic of thes e that they lead to probability distributions of the fortn 
dx (gaussian) 
where P (x) dx is the probability that the diffusing particle will have tnoved into 
the interval between x and x + dx after elapsed titne t. Titne enters through the 
rtns displacetnent 
where D is the diffusion coefficient, which is a function of pres sure, tetnperature, 
and concentration of the diffusing gases. In a fine- grained rock, an additional 
factor should be applied for the effects of pore geotnetry (tortuosity), effectively 
reducing D. A reasonable value for D (neglecting tortuosity) is - O. 1 Ctn2 / sec. 
If we take t = 3 x 107 seconds (::: 1 year), we have 
( ::: 25 tneters 
This tneans, for exatnple, that an initially well-defined concentration front will 
have stneared over -25 tneters after 1 year. It therefore appears that krypton-
85 (half-life 10.4 years) could eventually reach the surface, in an unsaturated 
rock, but at a negligible discharge rate into the attnosphere. 
The preceding argutnents apply to a dry tnediutn. Many, if not 
tnost, rock tnedia are expected to contain pore water. As mentioned in 
Section 4, provision is tnade to allow this water to drain around the 
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cavity liners, to a SUITlp. The presence of water in a fine grained rock will 
decrease the perITleability and increase the pressure required to force a 
gas through the rock. The pressure increase is required due to the need to 
displace capillary bound water froITl the pores. Clay ITlaterials in the pores 
als 0 swell and significantly reduce perITleability when wet. The flow in 
toward the cavity SUITlp will also tend to leach out any ITlaterial that does 
escape the containment liner. 
5.2 POROSITY AND PERMEABILITY OF ROCKS 
The previous section assuITled a uniforITl dry rock ITlediuITl 
characterized by a single porosity and a single perITleability. A "granite" 
ITlediuITl with O. 1 % porosity and 1-10 ITlillidarcy perITleability and a "sand-
stone/liITlestone" ITledium with 15 - 200/0 porosity and 1 - 10 ITlillidarcy 
perITleability were considered. Naturally occurring rock ITledia are not 
uniform and only approxiITlate these values in their bulk behavior. This 
section addresses the factors that lead to the bulk porosity and perITleability 
and the variations that ITlight be expected at typical site s. 
The ITlovement of fluids in rocks has been studied extensively 
by the petroleuITl industry, aITlong others. Two physical paraITleters of 
rock (or soil, sand, etc.) are of importance here: porosity and perITle-
ability. Porosity is a ITleasure of the capacity to store fluids, and perITle-
ability define s the capacity to transITlit fluids. A perITleable rock must have 
porosity, but porosity does not iITlply perITleability. In order for a rock to 
be perITleable, it ITlust have interconnecting pores, of super capillary size. 
Pumice is porous (up to 900/0 or ITlore void space) but not perITleable, since 
the pores are not interconnected. Shales and clays are also porous, but 
generally iITlperITleable because the pore s are extreITlely fine and filled 
with water. The roof rock in oil and gas pools is generally clay or clay-
containing, such as shales, sandy shales, or shaly sandstones. Although 
not strictly iITlpervious, the se rocks prevent upward seepage of gas and 
oil because the pressures available in the oil reservoirs are insufficient 
to displace capillary water froITl the extreITlely fine pores of the confining 
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strata. It should be noted that clays and shales comprise roughly 80% of 
all sedimentary rocks. 
Two types of porosity are distinguished: primary, or inter-
granular, as in a sand or sandstone; and secondary porosity. Secondary 
porosity is any form of void space which bears no direct relationship to the 
grains of the rock, and is also designated variously as intermediate, fracture, 
or induced porosity. In brittle rocks, fractures and joints are common 
forms of secondary porosity. The se joints occasionally enable even such 
intrinsically dense, non-porous rocks as granites to serve as productive 
reservoirs. Fractures and solution cavities and channels are important 
forms of porosity in carbonate rocks, the pores ranging from fractions 
of a millimeter at one extreme to large caverns at the other. Porosity 
and permeability are variable functions of position, even within a nominally 
homogeneous rock. 
Figure 5-3 (Ref. 5-1) shows measured porosities and permea-
bilitie s for about 500 small core sample s of a fine, uniform-grained sand-
stone from Pennsylvania. Permeabilities are conventionally measured 
parallel to the bedding plane s, using oven-dried specimens and dry air. 
Vertical permeabilities across bedding planes which are of primary inter-
est for underground power plants are usually lower. The use of dry air 
avoids problems introduced by the swelling of clay minerals typically found 
in reservoir rocks which decreases permeability. Where moisture is 
found in the rock the permeability will be reduced. 
It should be emphasized that the permeability of a sedimentary 
rock is generally greater in the horizontal direction, as a re suit of ar-
rangement and packing during deposition. In stratified rock the permea-
bility will vary from one stratum to the next. 
The following quotation is taken from Reference 5-2. 
lIMost of the oil and gas fields of the world are 
in sedimentary rocks, and most sedimentary rocks 
contain bedding planes or partings on which commonly, 
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although not invariably, there is a film or selvage of 
clay that may be an effective barrier to the free move-
ment of oil or gas from the rock on one side of the 
bedding plane to the rock on the other. Even where 
there is no clay film there may be induration or cemen-
tation at the bedding plane, which will reduce the perme-
ability. These bedding planes are believed to be re-
sponsible for the ob served phenomenon of very low 
vertical permeability as manife sted by the behavior 
of wells even though the measurements in the labor-
atory on short cylinders or " p l ugs " of the reservoir 
rock may have shown high permeability values. The 
samples tested in the laboratory rarely include bedding 
planes. In the process of coring to secure samples, 
the rock tends to break along clay partings and bedding 
planes so that the fragments that are available for 
measurements do not include the barriers to trans-
verse (i. e., vertical) movement of fluids. II 
Permeability can be even more variable in a rock having fracture 
porosity. Wells (oil or water) drilled into rock having only fracture porosity 
depend for their success upon intersecting a network of fractures through 
which the fluid may move freely. Production from such wells is very erratic, 
and dry holes often occur adjacent to productive wells. Great effort has gone 
into development of techniques to increase fracture porosity, such as "shooting" 
wells with high explosives, pumping of acid into limestone reservoirs, hy-
draulic fracturing, etc., and the recent Rulison and Gasbuggy nuclear gas-
stimulation tests (Project Plowshare). Such efforts are, of course, inap-
propriate at underground nuclear power plant site s where low permeability 
is desirable. The existence of these efforts suggests that sites with low 
permeabilitie s are not atypical. 
The principal oil and gas re servoir rocks are sandstone s (15% 
of all sedimentary rocks) and limestone (5%). Practically all sandstones 
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are interbedded with clays and shales, interrupting their permeability in 
the vertical direction, as in Figure 5 -4 from Reference 5 -1. This figure 
shows that even when large horizontal permeabilities are found, the vertical 
permeability can be quite small. 
The impermeability of strata at many natural site s suggests 
the possibility of tailoring the properties at a site to more closely fit those 
desired for siting an underground nuclear power plant. This possibility 
has not been examined in depth in this study but appears to be a viable 
option. It should be feasible, for example, to introduce a layer of clay 
containing material at the surface above the plant extending for several 
hundred yards. It may also prove desirable to introduce grout at some 
depth in the rock through drill hole s from the surface or from the cavity 
during construction. Grouting of rock media is an established procedure 
in many situations during excavation and construction. It is recommended 
that further investigation of the effectiveness, cost, and procedures for 
tailoring a site be included in future inve stigations. 
5.3 GROUNDWATER 
The loss of contaminated water from the reactor chamber 
following an accident could in principle pose a hazard to public water 
supplies, and must be considered in site selection. Strontium-90 (half-
life 28 years) and cesium-137 (33 yrs) are two of the principal isotopes 
of concern from this standpoint. The likelihood of this happening should be 
quite small if a drainage-sump system is introduced. Site-specific factors 
which would require consideration are proximity of aquifers, distance to 
wells or discharge area, "flow" rates, and mineral composition of the 
aquifer. The significance of the flow rates and distances to wells or dis-
charge area is clear. The mineral composition is important because of 
the process of ion-exchange, which acts to retard the rate of movement 
of the radioisotopes relative to that of the groundwater, and to dilute the 
concentration at any given distance. The effect is to disperse and delay 
the arrival of the radioactive contamination front at any point downstream. 
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D. 
Figure 5 -4. Section Through Springhill Sandstone (Chile) 
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Flow rates of ground water in aquifers are typically rather 
small, generally not greater than 5 ft per day, nor less than 5 ft per year. 
"Average" flow rates should be used with caution, however, because of the 
variability of permeability, as mentioned earlier. The relative proportion 
of radioisotope ions adsorbed in the solid phase of the aquifer minerals at 
equilibrium is given by the distribution coefficient Kd: 
ions in solid phase 
ions in solution x 
volume of solution 
weight of solid fraction 
where Ylvolume of solution" and "weight of solid fraction" refer to unit volume 
of aquifer material. The rate of transport of each radioactive species is 
reduced, relative to the groundwater flow rate, in proportion to its distri-
bution coefficient: 
where 
F. 
1 
F 
w 
p 
= 
= 
= 
F. = 
1 
rate 
flow 
F 
w 
of transport of ionic 
rate of water 
weis:ht of solid fraction 
volum.e of water 
1. e., 
s:m.s. of solid 
~ m.l of water 
species i 
(unit volum.e of aquifier) 
Some representative values of Kd are given in Table 5-2 (Ref. 5-3). 
Table 5-2 
REPRESENTATIVE DISTRIBUTION COEFFICIENT 
Medium. 
Hanford Soil 
Nevada Sandy Loan 
Savannah River 
Mixed Soils 
Distribution Coefficients (m.l/gm.) 
Cesium. Strontium. 
4500 
4500 
90 
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420 
650 
90 
A s an exatnple, as sutne an aquifer having the properties of 
Hanford Soil. The value of p is around 4 or 5 gtnS solid/tnl of water 
for typical aquifers. Assutne also a water flow rate of 1000 ft/yr. Then 
the average transport rate for cesiutn-137 is: 
F :::: 1000 ft/yr 
20000 
and for strontiutn-90 about 0.5 ft/yr. 
or . 05 ft/yr 
5. 4 FIELD MEASUREMENTS OF PERMEABILITY 
For reasons discus sed 'in Section 5. 2, the pertneability at a candi-
date site tnust be tneasured in situ. Reference 5-4 reports results of such 
tneasuretnents in granite, by the Swedish State Power Board, in pursuance 
of the Swedish nuclear siting progratn. For these tests, a horizontal hole 
was drilled to a length of 168 tneters in the side of the Ravfj~i.ll tnountain. 
The last 50 tneters of the bore were sealed off and pressurized with air. 
At the surface of the tnountain, about 27 tneters above the bore hole, 50 
short holes (10 tneters) were drilled at 45 0 to the vertical, so as to inter-
sect fissures in the rock. These fis sures were '''described as narrow, open 
and free of water. Air frotn these 50 bore holes was collected in glass 
containers filled with water, and volutne seepage rates were detertnined 
as a function of chatnber pressure. In other tests, krypton-85 was inj ected 
as a tracer and the transit titne frotn the chatnber to the surface was tneasured 
for different chatnber pressures, in steady-state flow. It was found that the 
transit titne of the tracer through - 25 tneters of granite was 1. 1 hours for 
a bore hole pres sure of 3. 3 attn, and - 2. 8 hours at a bore pres sure of 1. 9 
attn. Volutnetric flow at the higher bore pressure was 3.3 tn3 /hr at 1 
attnosphere. 
With plausible assutnptions, it is possible to estitnate the pertne-
ability of the Ravfjall granite frotn the data given. We assutne that the flow 
is radial in the vicinity of the bore hole but ultitnately is channeled through 
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fissures to the surface. The seepage rate is about 3 900 cm !sec at 1 atmos-
phere, for 3.3 atm in the bore hole. Darcy1s equation for steady-state 
isothermal flow in cylindrical symmetry is 
Q 27T Kh ,1P = 
/1 ln (r e! rb) 
where /1 = viscosity of air (centipoises) 
h = length of bore hole (cm) 
rb = radius of bore hole (cm) 
r = drainage radius, at 1 atm (P ) e e 
,1p = P b - P e in atm 
Q = fl . cc ow In--sec at P = (Pb + P e)!2 
K = permeability in darcies 
The logarithmic term is insensitive and is in the range 5 -7 numerically 
(r e is not known and rb is not given). Hence, the permeability is of the 
order 
K = 
6/1 In (r e / r b) 
2 7Th ,1P = 
-2 (900/2.1) x (2 x 10 ) x 7 _10- 3 
6. 3 x 5000 x 2. 3 
or 1 millidarcy. The assumed permeability in the idealized calculations 
earlier in this section was varied from 1 to 10 millidarcies. Because this 
flow takes place through narrow fissures (the bulk porosity of the rock is 
much smaller than for a sandstone) the rate of advance of the radioactive 
tracer through the rock is higher than it would be in a rock of similar perme-
ability but higher porosity. 
These measurements emphasize the importance of open joints 
and fissures and the consequent need for in situ testing of a candidate site. 
Although the tests just described are informative, they could not be re-
garded as adequate investigation of a site, but only as the initial phase of a 
site study. For instance, it was observed in these tests that as much as 
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30-40% of the leakage from the pressurized bore hole took place through a 
relatively confined area of faulted rock. One would want to see the effects 
of grouting of such areas. It would also be of interest to see the effects of 
cavity liners, surface soil layers, and so on. 
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SECTION 6 
OPERA TIONAL CONSIDERA TIONS 
6. 1 NORMAL OPERA TION 
The operations normally associated with a nuclear power 
plant are those required when the plant is operating to produce power, 
and those conducted when the plant is shut down for reactor refueling, 
plant inspection, or repair. Some maintenance functions for a surface 
plant are accomplished while the plant is operating. Major maintenance 
is accomplished during periods of either routine or emergency shut-
down and during annual reactor refueling. It is expected that an 
underground nuclear power plant could be operated in much the same 
manner. Access for routine maintenance to an underground plant will 
be the same as in comparable areas of the surface plants. However, 
less working space may be available in some areas, making the 
performance of some functions more difficult. 
The difficulty and long time needed to remove large pieces 
of equipment to the surface from an underground plant suggests that 
within the technical resources of the plant all maintenance and repair be 
accomplished in place. In order to accomplish inspection and repair 
some equipment requires disassembly. Some pieces of equipment, 
such as feed water heaters and turbine cases, when disassembled occupy 
a great amount of additional floor space. Also the disassembled 
equipment pieces are very large and heavy, making compact storage 
difficult. The need for temporary storage space for thes e items can be 
provided by increasing the excavated chamber sizes at some expense 
in the cost of the chamber. Removal of the pieces to the surface may 
be a more attractive alternative. The permanent installation of hoisting 
machinery of much greater capacity than needed for normal maintenance 
would also be expensive unless the hoisting could be done with temporary 
equipment. The trade-off evaluation of such issues should be accomplished 
as details of the underground design are further developed. 
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The method of transporting radioactive material from the 
surface to the plant was briefly considered in the study. Handling of the 
spent fuel appears the most difficult. Safety considerations restrict 
the lifting height of container s for spent fuel to their corresponding 
impact strength. A long simple lift up a deep shaft would not be a 
satisfactory access for spent fuel capsules under present procedural 
guidelines. A tunnel, or possibly an inclined shaft, would be more 
satisfactory. This tunnel or inclined shaft would be greater in length 
and consequently more costly than a simple shaft but might also be 
used to provide heavy equipment access during excavation and 
construction of the plant. Other radioactive wastes in liquid and solid 
form could also be removed by truck through such a tunnel access to 
the plant. An alternate method of pumping the liquid waste to the surface 
appears less attractive because of special physical protection possibly 
needed for long pipe lengths carrying radioactive liquids. 
Several unfavorable is sues of underground plant operation and 
maintenance have been identified. Other factor s unique to undergrounding 
are an asset. The underground plant receives natural protection from 
the elements such as rain, dust, sand and snow. For surface plants 
special treatment in the design of equipment is necessary to protect 
against elemental effects. largely eliminated in the underground plant. 
All weather shirt- sleeve working conditions are also a natural benefit 
of under grounding. The importance of such benefits and the degree they 
offset the disadvantages are not completely known at this time. 
6.2 CONSTR UCTION 
It is assumed that the underground power plant will be sited near 
the coast. The costing exercises performed in Section 7 assume about 
250 ft of cover over the plant and a location 2, 000 ft inland from the water 
line. Figure 6-1 is an idealized layout of the power plant with a separation 
of the main galleries equal to twice the width of the galleries. A 
machinery as sembly area is located at one end of the turbine generator 
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Figure 6-1. Sample Layout Underground PWR Nuclear Power Plant 
688 ft 
gallery where major components could be lowered through a large access 
shaft or brought in through an acces s tunneL These components will 
then be moved to the various galleries via a series of tunnels. It is 
assumed because of the very large dimensions of the galleries that 
excavation of the rock in the galleries would be accomplished by drill 
blast and muck method using benches starting at the spring line of the roof 
and cutting several benches to reach the floor leveL The cooling water 
tunnels could be used for muck removal and the rock used for erosion 
control and construction of a break water at the shore line. Because the 
other tunnels are relatively short, it is assumed that they would be formed 
by drill blast and muck method. The cooling water tunnels could be 
constructed by using a boring machine or by conventional methods. 
Depending upon the quality of the rock, it may be necessary to 
cast the roof and walls of the large galleries as the excavation is taking 
place for protection of the workers. It may be necessary to line the 
walls and roofs with rock-bolted wire mesh and gunite. 
The excavation would be mined by the drill, blast and muck, 
bench method. A possible improvement in smooth wall excavation could 
be accomplished by wire sawing the long walls of a horseshoe room prior 
to benching. This would prevent damage to the adjacent rock during the 
blasting and may be less expensive than conventional smooth wall blasting. 
To accomplish thi s it would be neces sary to us e the bench method and, at 
the corners of a gallery, small pits would be excavated and the wire sawing 
equipment would be installed. The wir e saws would then cut the rock the 
depth of one bench. The bench would then be removed by conventional 
means. 
Excavation of the gallerie s would go on simultaneously with 
access to the galleries by interconnecting tunnels. Because of the large 
volume of rock in the galleries the use of a conveyor system is postulated 
to remove the rock through one of the cooling water tunnels. If the rock is 
of good quality, some of it could be stock piled for aggr egate for the 
concrete required to line the chambers. 
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One way of accomplishing the fabrication of the liner is shown 
in Figure 6-2. The specially formed angles would allow all welding to be 
accomplished inside the chamber. The back angle would be welded to the 
liner. This would be followed by radiographic inspection of the welds. 
Next the front angle would be welded to the plates and radiographic 
inspection of those welds would be made. The angles form a relatively 
flexible joint to take up plate thermal expansion. An alternative would be 
to include a system of closely spaced plate anchors. Shoring would then 
be placed to hold the plate in plate and concrete would be placed behind 
the plate. 
The construction of the underground facility not including equip-
ment installation might take about four years as shown in Figure 6-3. 
~ Item 1 2 3 4 
Move In and 
Site Preparation I I 
Shafts, Tunnels, 
and Adits I -; 
Excavate 
Galleries 
Line Tunnels 
Line Galleries 
Line Reactor 
Gallery I 
Figure 6-3: Postulated Construction Schedule 
This is a conservative estimate based on an excavation rate of 
1000 cubic yards per day in the main galleries after the roof arch has been 
formed. Rates of this magnitude have been achieved on large hydroelectric 
power plants. It should be noted that weather conditions should not hamper 
an underground construction job. 
6 - 5 
~ 
0' 
0' 
N 
o 
<Xl 
<:!' 
N 
... 
N 
N 
.... 
" G ( o( v 0 0 c, C ~ 
c C 
o C 
GCC/t: " oo·oo~C'GCC'OO 
, 0 "",' 0' l' v 0 0 C ,,(t G C 
, S ' (" l G he. 0 "c • 0 
00'- c r<-IJ c(,_~ 0 (( (,0 0 ':;" C c,CiO - <)0 (..<.,C ~ \.. () , 0 (; , t: C <ou CCO o,CO o ,iJ 
o COG \ v C , COO <~ COo 0 cOO 0 
r C ( 0 = 0 ",C 0 0 < 0 
o C C ' Q 0 0 , 0 ,,~C' 0 < '0 0' 0 (, 
0
0 ADO 
(' c VOe 
CO oOO"C' h
QO 
0
0 
_ c ce  a ( °V 0 0 ceo C G 
,t DCQ o,oc 00 
co ° 0 'c 0 0 C c cO 0 000 0 ell! 0 
< lJ ceo 0 0 ° 0 c C (, 
, cc~oc ,0 " 
o CO C C ~ 0 c Ooou 0 
<::> C'c(( C.ouoc 0 o c o 0 
... j j 1\;;; fl. ;9;;7;;j i 
c c 
o < , ~00oC 0 ,0<-
(., c' c c c::. c 
C .AD 0 0 A 0 < c ¥I4J () v L"J U 
' <> '1'7'0 C'O, 0 c 0 CeO 
v ¥o 0 C <:> C v 0 G 
o 
o , 
c <:) 
(, 0 r, 
" 0 0 C, 0" (. C- ( 
ol"F 0 c &.p! ( •. (, u 
C 
Figure 6-2. Reactor Chamber Liner Joint Section 
8ft,' 
/J 
c 0 
o a 
, 0 
~00 0 L" 
o 
, 0 
oc, {~{' 
(., (" (") (" 
L C '--- C' 
(. Cl 0 (:,' , 
eLL ' ~ 
"r (,( <. ( (. --' v C 
o 0 
SECTION 7 
COSTS 
7. 1 COSTING APPROACH 
The method of costing the completed underground plant originally 
planned in this study was to obtain the cost breakdown for an existing surface 
plant of the same size and subtract the costs for the construction of the 
buildings and equipment installation. Then add to this cost the cost 
of construction of the underground galleries and tunnels together with the 
cost involved in the installation of the equipment. The installation costs 
will be higher because of the additional task of lowering the equipment 
through the acces s shafts and moving it horizontally through the tunnels to 
the various galleries. Some equipment costs will also vary with some 
higher and others lower. The critical item in this costing exercise is that 
of obtaining a comprehensive cost breakdown on an existing surface nuclear 
plant. At this time these costs, are not available; therefore, cost estimates 
have been made for the excavation and liners only. A more detailed 
examination of the cost differential for underground plants should be 
accomplished in future studies. 
7.2 EXCAVATION 
The baseline costing model is for a granite site having good 
quality rock with an RQD greater than 0.80 to 0.85. This assumes that the 
area contains homogeneous rock which is free from faults and has tight 
joints at a relatively large spacing. This type of rock would not require 
temporary supports during the excavation phase although it may require the 
use of some rock bolts and chain link fencing as a safety item to prevent 
injury to the workers. The baseline configuration of the galleries is a 
modified parabolic horseshoe design which minimizes stress concentration 
in the roofs and walls. The excavation costs were analyzed parametrically 
to include other materials such as sandstone and limestone of equal RQD 
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value. Also considered are rocks of poorer quality where some shoring 
would be required during the excavation phase. A plant of this size would 
not be constructed in poor quality rock because of high construction costs 
and the difficulty of the construction proces s. 
The unit costs for the baseline configurations are based on the 
following material properties: 
seismic for ce 
rock quality 
rock type 
steel yield strength 
concrete compressure strength 
reinforcing steel 
arch ris e to span ratio 
0, 5 g containment ar ea s 
0, 25 g all other areas 
80-85 RQD 
granite 
60,000 psi 
4, 000 psi 
10/0 
1/8 
The unit cost derived from averaging several large underground 
hydroelectric power plants and the Cheyenne Mountain NORAD Facility 
costs are: 
shaft excavation 
tunnel excavation 
gallery excavation 
reinforced concrete 
steel reactor liner 
$60 per yd3 
$20 per yd 3 
$20 per yd 3 3 $100 per yd inp1ace 
$20 per ft2 
These costs are affected by many factors and are thought to be 
conservative. Harza Engineering Company, Chicago, Illinois has generally 
used lower unit costs in estimating large excavations. 
Franklyn C. Roger s of the Har za Company, state s in the 
October 1971 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: 
llAssuming good rock conditions, reasonably straight-
forward excavation progres s, no mor e than occasional 
supporting of the rock and a normal level of precautionary 
measures, it is entirely feasible to achieve an excavation 
cost in the neighborhood of $5 to $10 per cubic yard. If 
local practices demand more than usual safety precautions 
and other restrictive limitations which prevail in certain 
urban areas, the excavation cost would probably be in the 
neighborhood of $15 per cubic yard. The figures would be 
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us ed for pricing of underground chamber s to house 
reactors and, if such were placed underground, turbines, 
condensers and generators. II 
It is possible that this estimate is based on sandstone or 
limestone such as encountered in the Chicago Sewer Project. The cost 
of excavation will vary with the type of rock to some degree. Generally 
speaking, excavation in sandstone or limestone should be 150/0 to 20% less 
than granite. Therefore, in this study we have used a figure of $17 per 
cubic yard for this type of rock with an RQD of about 85. 
If the RQD is around 60, it is assumed that woven wire mesh 
and rock bolts will be required during the excavation phase to stabilize 
the roof and walls. This would add a cost of $2 per square foot of surface 
area. 
If the site contains poor rock with an RQD near 40, more extensive 
work would be required to support the walls during excavation. The use 
of wire mesh, rock bolts, roof and wall ties and shotcrete would cost 
approximately $6 per square foot of surface area. 
In these cases of poorer rock, it is questionable if openings of 
the size required could be made unless incremental construction of the 
roof and wall liner is accomplished during the excavation phase. This 
would require a longer construction period and also tend to increase costs. 
7.3 LINER COSTS 
The horseshoe configuration for the galleries was selected to 
reduce the thicknes s and cost of the liner. Preliminary designs were 
prepared for several configurations. A flat wall and arch configuration 
with a seismic loading of O. 5g required a wall that was twice as expensive 
as that required for the horseshoe configuration. In the case of a Ig 
loading the wall was three times as expensive. One component of the 
wall which has a fixed cost is the steel liner required for the reactor 
gallery. This liner was assumed to consist of a 3/8 inch steel plate 
with steel angles covering both sides of all joints to minimize leakage. 
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The volume between the angle and the steel plate could be pressurized 
with a gas so that there will be no leakage from the reactor gallery 
into the concrete walls and surrounding rock through the welded joints. 
The unit costs used for the liner s are $100 per cubic yard for 
concrete in place using 1 % reinforcing steel. The steel liner for the 
reactor chamber was costed at $20 per square foot which includes 
radiographic inspection of all welds and pressurization of the welded 
areas. 
7.4 SUMMARY 
Costs of three configurations have been developed as a base-
line. The costing was performed by developing preliminary wall designs 
for each of the items and computing excavation volumes, reinforced 
concrete volumes and cost of a steel liner in the reactor chamber where 
applicable. The baseline construction costs are for excavation in a granitic 
rock with an RQD of 85 or greater with costs of $17.7 million for the BWR 
minimum modification configuration, $15.5 million for the reconfigured 
BWR, and $13.7 million for the PWR configuration. 
If the power plants were sited in sandstone or limestone instead 
of granite, the excavation costs would be $17 per cubic yard inst ead of 
$20 per cubic yard. This would result in a 15% savings in excavation 
costs or a savings of $1. 8 million for the BWR minimum modification 
configuration, $1. 6 million for the reconfigured BWR and $1. 4 million 
for the PWR configuration. A savings of 15% in excavation costs would 
result in about a 10% savings in the overall construction costs, 
The effects of rock quality on the excavation costs are more 
severe because of the requirements for temporary shoring, rock bolting, 
wire mesh, guniting, etc., to keep the rock in place prior to construc-
tion of the reinforced concrete liners. In addition, the liners must be 
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thicker to support the rock. These changes reflect an increase in the 
underground construction as shown below. For an RQD of 60 the cost 
for the BWR minimum modification configuration is $33.4 million or an 
increase of 89% over the baseline costs, for the reconfigured B WR the 
costs are $26.4 million, an increase of 70% and for the PWR the costs are 
$23.6 million representing an increase of 72% as shown in Figure 7-1. 
In the case of a poor rock with an RQD of 40 the cost for 
the BWR minimum modification configuration is $52.1 million which 
is an increase of 194% over the baseline costs; for the reconfigured 
BWR, costs are $40. 0 million an increase of 158% and for the PWR, 
$34. 7 million or 153% increase. These large increases are mostly 
dUe to walls up to 25 feet thick. Obviously it is impractical to con-
struct an underground facility such as this at a site characterized by 
significant seismic loads (i. e., non negligible) and poor rock quality 
(Figure 7 -2). The cost impact of reduced rock quality (RQD) indicated 
in Figure 7-2 is, of course, only broadly representative with large 
variations likely at actual sites. 
Seismic acceleration levels effect the thickness of the re-
inforced concrete cavity liners in a linear manner. Thus the effect 
on costs are also linear as shown in Figure 7-3. 
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SECTION 8 
SITING CRITERIA 
In the process of completing the study activities summarized 
in previous sections, information has been derived relative to the charac-
teristics of the site where an underground nuclear power plant can be 
sited. While it has not been pos sible to develop rigid acceptance criteria, 
summary statements can be made relative to preferred site characteris-
tics. These characteristics have been reviewed in an effort to identify those 
factors that are mandatory and those that are highly desirable. They are 
further subdivided by the requirement that dictates the site survey guide-
line. For example, the permeability and porosity of the rock are dictated 
most directly by the requirements for containment. If a plant is to be 
sited underground primarily to improve containment and reduce the popu-
lation center separation distance, then the range of acceptable permeabilities 
and porosities will be more demanding than if other objectives are sought. 
Permeability and porosity are of indirect importance to the constructability 
of the plant. Site selection criteria for underground nuclear power plants 
will remain somewhat uncertain until the objectives of such siting is de-
termined. 
In formulating siting criteria, it is tempting to identify the 
most restrictive and critical parameters to minimize the number of sites 
that must be evaluated in detail. In principle, one might imagine a comp-
rehensive set of detailed contour maps for each of the critical siting pa-
rameters. These contour maps could be transferred to a transparency with 
unacceptable areas made opaque. By superimposing a set of these trans-
parencies, one for each criterion, and holding them up to the light, only a 
few points of light will be seen corresponding to acceptable sites. Unfortunately, 
such contour maps do not exist. Even if such maps were available, it is 
possible that no sites would be found that meet all criteria. This does not 
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rule out the possibility of underground siting. Site surveys should adopt 
broad guidelines to assure that the best siting areas are identified and 
recognize that final site selection may involve some compromise away from 
the ideal site. 
The construction of site criteria should also be influenced by 
a judgment relative to what is available and how the information might be 
used. Perhaps the most obvious example of the USe of available data is 
the specification of igneous or sedimentary rocks. The geologic origin of 
the rock is unimportant in itself, but such data is readily available and 
meaningful inferences can be drawn from the known characteristics of these 
classes of rocks. Conversely comprehensive permeability maps do not 
exist and the cost of developing such maps would be enormous. The form-
ulation of site selection criteria must be influenced by the type of inform-
ation that is available and the procedure s that can be practically used to 
locate site s. 
The broad siting guidelines identified in this study are summar-
ized in tabular format below. 
Requirement 
Excavation 
Safety, Costs, 
and Structure 
Loads 
Guideline 
RQD 
The RQD index has been used as a coarse 
index of rock quality. Large span require-
ments suggest an RQD greater than 750/0 
c orre sponding to good and excellent rocks 
is strongly desired. Sites with an RQD less 
than 600/0 will lead to very costly excavations 
and are therefore unacceptable. Intermediate 
RQDs are marginally a.cceptable. 
Rock Strength & Modulus 
No numerical criteria are specified for rock 
strength or modulus because most rock media 
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GeoITletric 
that COITlply with the ROD criterion will in-
herently possess sufficient strength. (SoITle 
very weak sandstone or shale ITlay have in-
adequate strength but high ROD). These pa-
raITleters should be recorded as part of siting 
surveys. 
Area 
The configurations developed in this study re-
quire an area of at least 700 x 700 feet. This 
size is judged a ITlandatory ITliniITluITl. An area 
of at least 1000 x 1000 is a reasonable "desired" 
criterion. 
Depth 
The large galleries postulated in this study 
require a thickness of ITlechanically uniforITl, 
cOITlpetent rock of 180 feet and preferably 
210 feet. This thicknes s should be topped by 
at least 60 feet of additional rock, weathered rock 
or soil cover such that the base of the construction 
region is at a depth of at least 240 feet. 
Ocean ProxiITlity 
The present study has assuITled the use of ocean 
water for cooling. EconoITlics will dictate the 
ITliniITluITl acceptable distance froITl the shore. A 
reasonable ITlaxiITluITl of five ITliles ITlight be used 
in early site surveys as de sirable with no liITlit 
specified as ITlandatory. 
Topography 
Surface topography is largely iITlITlaterial for 
selection of the underground plant. An average 
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Geologic 
Containment 
slope from the ocean shore should be large 
enough to meet the depth of cover requirements 
consistent with economic lengths of cooling water 
tunnels. A target rise of one in five from sea 
level is de sired. 
Rock Type 
No criterion is specified limiting site selection 
to igneous, sedimentary, or metamorphic rocks. 
Thick sedimentary deposits may be favored for 
containment. Uniformity of the mechanical prop-
erties is judged more important than geologic 
das sification. 
Tectonic Stresses 
Unusual tectonic stresses should be avoided par-
ticularly where significant horizontal stresses 
are encountered. 
Porosity and Permeability 
Sites should not be excluded at this time solely 
on the basis of permeability or porosity. These 
quantities should be recorded during site sur-
veys. Low permeabilities are desired, prefer-
ably below 10 millidarcies. High porosities are 
also desired but no numerical limit is proposed. 
Saturation 
Saturation of the pores is judged a favorable 
characteristic. Natural flowing aquifers should 
be avoided. 
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Seismic 
Other 
Jointing 
J ointing is an unfavorable characteristic but 
cannot be avoided. Containment will be im-
proved where joints are well cemented pre-
ferably with clay containing materials to 
impede fluid flow and reduce fracture perme-
ability. 
Fault Proximity 
A quantitative fault separation distance has 
not been established. Faults should not run 
through the site or immediate area. 
Discontinuities 
Major mechanical discontinuities should be 
avoided even though not as sociated with 
faulting, e. g. a sedimentary-igneous bound-
ary should not cross the site volume. 
Criteria for population centers, electrical 
system compatibility, political exclusion 
(e. g. Indian Reservations), etc. have not 
been formulated. 
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APPENDIX I 
EUROPEAN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR PLANTS 
Several underground nuclear power plants have been constructed 
and successfully operated in Europe. A summary of the significant features 
of each underground plant is presented in Table I-I. An obvious feature 
of all the plants is that they are relatively small in size (8.5 to 266 MW e ). 
The motivation for undergrounding the plant appea,rs to be insurance of 
containment of accidently released radioactivity and also physical 
protection from damage due to hostile military action. The sites are 
all in rock and the depths and covers are nominally between 15 to 
30 meters depending on the site. The plant at Chooz, France has the 
largest span of 69 feet. In all but one of the plants, the turbine generator 
is located at the surface. One of the plants (Agesta) supplies steam for 
space heating of a nearby large apartment complex. Since the construction 
of the Halden Reactor in 1955, Norway has maintained a growing interest 
in underground nuclear plants. Recently some details of their effort were 
disclosed at the 1971 International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy. Norway's effort included study of plant configurations 
of 500 MWe size for BWR and Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) with 
siting at the surface and underground. The design approach was to place 
the entire plant underground with the reactor and turbine generator in a 
common gallery. The span of the largest gallery was 30 m (98 feet) and 
total excavation 264, 000 m 3 (345, 000 yd3 ) or about 19 cu. ft. /Kw. 
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TABLE I-I 
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
Configuration Reactor Chamber 
Name and Turbine Dimensions 
Location Size Purpose Generator Reactor Depth (feet) 
Halden 98' long 
Norway 25 Mwt Experimental None Rock Cavern 98 feet 85' high 
(BHWR) 33' wide 
H 
Agesta Above ground 88' long 
Stockholm, 80 Mwt/ Heat & Power at reactor Rock Cavern 49 feet 66' high 
Sweden 20 Mwe grade level 54' wide 
(PHWR) 
J 
Chooz 138' long 
Ardennes, 266 Mwe Power Above ground Rock Cavern 
--
146 r high 
France 69' wide 
N 
Lucerne 30 Mwt/ Experimental/ Rock Cavern Rock Cavern 
- - - -
Switz erland 8.5 Mwe Power 
'--------- ------ - ---I...... ~--.-- ... -.-~- - ---~ -~---
APPENDIX II 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE SIZE OF UNDERGROUND OPENINGS 
by 
Warren Pfefferle 
1-1ining engineers have long associated increased size of 
excavation with increased costs, increased difficulty in construction, and 
a probable overall reduction in stability of the resulting excavation. While 
this opinion is nearly universally held by all those associated with tunneling, 
mining, and other underground excavation construction, it has never been 
quantified in any reliable fashion. Indeed, from a study of elasticity theory 
one would judge that any investigation into the effects of size on strength 
must go beyond the theories of elasticity and considerations of pure size 
itself. More than likely the observed size effects will be dependent upon 
the absolute strength of the rock medium. variations in strength within the 
rock mass, and the exact nature of any nonuniformity or anisotropy. 
However, the major factor in the observed reduced strength is probably 
the occurrence of discrete weaknesses in the rock. that is, presence 
of joints, faults, and microfractures. As the sample of rock increases, 
the probability of finding a worst case weakening factor increases. 
Based on this one might expect that a long, small diameter tunnel with 
a surface area equal to a very large cylindrical chamber would have 
the same strength. Experience would probably not bear out this con-
clusion because still another factor, which is more social than engineer-
ing. enters into the des cription of tunnel rock excavation failures --
namely. does failure stop the construction for any appreciable period 
of time. say greater than a shift, or does the failure result in a 
hazard to personnel or loss of life? Assume a given defect occurs 
under two circumstances, first near an eight-foot diameter tunnel, 
and second near an eighty-foot radius arch. In the first case a casual 
arrangement of steel sets and lagging would probably prevent the falling 
rock from causing loss of life. When the weakened tunnel section is 
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observed, the shift foreman might scale the loose rock and make repairs 
with materials and manpower available during the ordinary work shift. In 
the second case, however, the same initial failure would propagate on a 
large scale and involve such a large area that a major calamity would 
ensue. Thus the consequences of a given rock defect or initial failure may 
vary nearly as the cube of the cavity size and, therefore, willingness to 
open a cavity might decrease something like the cube of the cavity size. 
Human factors, therefore, are likely to have a major impact in the final 
determination of just how large a cavity we desire for a given purpose. 
Since limitations on cavity size are primarily bas ed on 
experience rather than on a theoretical foundation, it is quite natural to 
examine existing cavities and how they have performed over the years. 
Several spectacular natural rock spans are familiar to most of us. 
First is Carlsbad Caverns made up mostly of Pennsylvanian and Permian 
limestones, The largest chamber in the Carlsbad Caverns is some 
4, 000 feet long, nearly 625 feet wide and 350 feet high. This cavity has been 
standing for thousands of years without benefit of roof bolts, steel sets, 
gunite or concrete. Any cementing or grouting of rock joints was 
concurrent with the formation of the cavity. Closer to Southern California 
area is the Rainbow Natural Bridge in southern Utah. This natural 
bridge arches 305 feet above the stream which meanders through the 
gorge beneath. It has a clear span of 270 feet- -again, much larger than 
man-made excavations. Numerous similar natural bridges and sea caves 
are found along the coast of California where the soft sandstone sand 
mudstones have been undercut by wave action. Two natural cavities in 
Virginia are also worth noting, first the Natural Tunnel in Scott County, 
Virginia, which is used as a railway tunnel by the Southern Railway. 
This natural excavation has a length of 900 feet averaging 75 feet in height 
with a clear span of about 130 feet. Natural Bridge, southwest of 
Lexington, Virginia, is in use as a highway bridge. It is a rock span 
about 90 feet long varying in width from 50 to 150 feet with a rock 
thickness of about 50 feet at the crown. It arches 200 feet above the 
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narrow gorge of Cedar Creek. The foregoing natural rock cavities help 
place the excavations of man in their proper per spective. For example, 
Churchill Falls Hydroelectric Project, the largest of its type in the 
western world, has a clear span of about 81 feet in its largest chamber, 
the power house. This excavation is 972 feet long and rises to a maximum 
height of 154 feet. The rock material is designated as a homogeneous, 
granite gneis s. This rock is of high quality, and only moderate 
stabilization by such methods as rock bolting was required. For the 
roof of the power house rock bolt length varied up to about 45 feet. 
Another large successful underground excavation is the machine hall on 
Washington's Pend Oreille River. The tur1:>ine room is 477 feet long with 
a 76-foot span and a roof height up to 190 feet. Again, with minor 
exceptions rock bolts were used to support all excavations with 15-foot 
bolts on a 6-foot pattern used in the roof of the power house. Spot bolts 
up to 30 feet long were added where adverse jointing was encountered. 
Sprayed concrete and chain link fencing serve to contain rock falls and 
a weather roof of corrugated metal protects the floor below from water 
dripping off the roof. A somewhat larger underground power house was 
constructed in what was considered a bad rock condition at British 
Columbia I s Portage Mountain Darn. The rock at this location consists 
of thickly bedded, medium grain sandstone and fine grain, grey to black 
siltstone and shale with some finely sheared zones and coal seams. The 
strike of the beds is parallel to the power house chamber and dips about 
six degrees downstream, resulting in a stair step or shingle pattern in 
the arched roof of the excavation. First, the roof was rock-bolted by 
bolts most of which extend over 10 to 20 feet to anchor in a massive 
sandstone stratum above the arch crown. Then a concrete arch roof, two 
and one-half feet thick at the center and four and one-half feet thick at 
the abutments provide a permanent lining in the cavity. This combination 
is considered to have been effective in stabilizing the 85-1/2 foot span 
by 890 -foot long main excavation even though significant movements of 
the cavern roof were observed during construction. 
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Practical limitations on cavity size must consider the value of 
a large, clear span for a given project, including such imponderables as 
the potential loss of human life during construction, and unfavorable public 
reaction to additional unplanned expenditur es to repair rock failures after 
construction has begun. A first approximation could be made on the basis 
of elasticity theory if the excavation is for a flat roof cavity in massive 
sedimentary rock. For example, in a massive sandstone or limestone 
having a flexural strength of approximately 400 to 600 psi, a clear span 
of about 100 feet would require a layer thickness of at least 40 feet to 
provide an adequate margin of safety. This layer thickness may either 
be a naturally occurring situation or a thickness that is built up by 
grouting and rock bolting the rock mas s prior to opening the excavation to 
its full span. Similarly, though in perhaps a less clearly defined manner, 
a jointed rock medium could be studied to determine the largest and most 
significant defect likely to occur in the final excavation and then to 
assess the required degree of rock bolting or other rock stabilization 
required to retain the volume of rock likely to be involved in an incipient 
failure. In this latter case of a severely jointed igneous rock it is more 
than likely the design would have to proceed in step with actual excavation 
since it is unlikely that any program of exploration prior to the start of 
on- site construction would be thorough enough to provide the detailed 
jointing information that would be necessary for design purposes on a 
conservative and yet economical basis. 
Turning now to the specific problem of underground nuclear 
power plants, we find that the desired clear span is relatively large with 
respect to the size of excavations that have been constructed for other 
civil works projects. There is also a need for substantial economy and a 
very high factor of safety in the finished construction. Both these factors 
plus the natural geology of the California coast make it a strong 
probability that such a power plant would be constructed in a sedimentary 
rock at a relatively shallow depth, say about 300 feet. Under these 
conditions a vertical ellipsoid or large diameter cylinder with a dome top 
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would probably lend itself quite well to specialized excavation methods 
that would produce a large span cavity on a very economical basis. 
For planning purposes it is probably reasonable to consider dome 
diameters in the 1Z0 to ZOO-foot range. Flat roofs might also be 
considered if detailed site investigation indicates exceptionally massive 
bedding of rock with a flexural strength in excess of about 400 psi. 
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Name 
Natural 
Rainbow Natural 
Bridge 
Southe rn Utah 
Carlsbad Caverns 
Carlsbad, New Mexico 
Mammoth Dome 
Mammoth Cave, Kentucky 
Natural Tunnel 
Virginia 
Natural Bridge 
Virginia 
Man Made 
Straight Creek Tunnel 
Liverpool Road Tunnel 
England 
Lucerne Highway Tunnel 
Churchill Falls 
Labrador 
Hydropower Plant 
Morrow Point 
Colorado 
Hydro Powe r Plant 
Portage Dam 
British Columbia 
Hydro Power Plant 
Boundary Dam 
Washington 
NORAD Facility 
Colorado Springs 
TABLE II-I 
LARGE ROCK SPANS 
Size 
270' Wide 
305' High 
Arch 
625' Wide 
300' High 
4000' Long 
Irregular Shape 
150' Wide 
80-250' High 
400' Long 
130' Wide 
75' High 
900' Long 
90' Span (50' Thick) 
200' High 
50-150' Wide 
42 x 44 
(45 x 55 exc) 
1873' Guage Zone 
8940 Overall 
34' (j) 
7000' Long 
34-1/2' (j) 
2-5100' 
81'Wide 
154' High 
972 Long 
57' Wide 
134' High 
206' Long 
(400' Rock Cover) 
85' Wide 
~551 High 
890' Long 
76' Wide 
190' High 
477' Long 
Multiple 
Chambers 
with 35 & 45' 
Clear Spans 
Rock Type 
Sandstone 
Limestone 
Limestone 
Limestone 
Gauge Zone 
Granite 
SS, More 
LS, More 
Granite/ 
Gneiss 
Schist, 
Quartzite 
Sandstone, 
Shale, 
Siltstone 
Dolomitic 
Granite 
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Date 
In Use as a 
Rail Tunnel 
In Use as a 
Highway 
Bridge 
Current 
(1969-72) 
1968 
1971 
1967 
1970 
1967 
1964 
Remarks 
Sprayed Concrete Liner 
Largest hydroelectric 
project in Western 
world. 1000' roc~ 
cover -2-1/2 x 10 CY 
rock excavation 
Concrete roof arch, 
rock walls 
Rock bolted wall and 
arch 
Rock bolt and mesh 
APPENDIX III 
DEPTH OF BURIAL ANALYSIS EQUATIONS 
The equations used in the depth of burial analysis dis-
cussed in Section 4. 1 are listed below. These equations are standard 
solutions for simple elastic problems and are derived and discussed 
in many texts. See. for example, "Rock Mechanics and the Design 
of Structures in Rock. "by L. Obert and W. Duvall. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
1967. 
Spherical Cavity 
Stress due to lithostatic load: 
= 
-yz 
14-IOV «
9-15V) A 3 
R3 
[ ( 14 - 1 0 V _ ( 5 -~ ~V) 
12 A + v -YZ 5) ( ) ( ) 
- R5 y:v- 14-IOv 
+ (--.!:!.-) ( _ Y Z \ [(30V - IS) A 3 
I-v 14-IOvj R3 
Stress due to cavity pressure: 
P 
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Cylindrical Cavity 
Stress due to lithostatic load: 
Stress due to cavity pressure: 
P 
Where: 
lJ, Poisson's ratio 
y, rock densi ty 
Z, distance measured from ground surface 
R, distance measured from cavity center 
A. cavity radius 
P, cavity pressure 
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APPENDIX IV 
FL UID FLOW THROUGH PERMEABLE MEDIA 
The llloveIllent of liquids and gases through perIlleable Illedia 
is governed by Darcy's law. which in its siIllplest forlll is 
where 
K 
v = ~P 
11 
v is volullle rate of flow of fluid per unit area, 
K is perIlleabili ty of the Illediulll, 
11 is viscosity of the fluid. and 
.6,P is pres sure gradient. 
By reason of the enorlllOUS internal-surface area of poro:tJ.s 
Illedia, the flow is dOlllinated by viscous resistance, and is therefore 
independent of inertial forces. At very high rates of flow (turbulent 
flow) deviations frolll Darcy's law set in, corresponding to an apparent 
decrease in perIlleability. i. e .• Darcy's law overestilllates the flow 
rate in this case. For our purposes, the law is valid or would conserva-
tively overestilllate flow rates. 
The perIlleability of a rock saIllple is in principle a geollletric 
property. Fluid properties enter the Darcy equation only through the 
viscosity. 11. PerIlleabilities are Illeasured in the laboratory by driving 
dry air through slllall oven-dried speciIllens. and Illeasuring the steady-
state rate of flow at a fixed pressure differential across the saIllple. 
The perIlleability. K. is found frolll the equation 
( 1) 
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where Q is the volume rate of flow in cm /sec at pressure P 
o 0 
P = 
o 
/1 = 
L,A = 
outlet pressure, 
inlet pres sure. 
viscosity of air, and 
length. cross-sectional area of sample. 
If pressures are measured in atmospheres, length in centimeters, and 
viscosity in centipoises (/1 ::::1 cp for water, ::::.02 cp for air, ::::.025 cp 
for krypton and xenon at ::::300o K), then K is in darcies. For example, 
suppose the test core is I cm in length. 1 cm2 in cross -section, P. is 
1 
2 atm, P is 1 atm. K = O. 1 millidarcies, then 
o 
Q = 3 
2 
= • 0075 
3 
cm 
sec 
(1 atm). (2) 
Permeabilities may also be measured in situ by pressurization 
of drill holes; the permeabilities in the vicinity of the Hard Hat nuclear 
test were determined in this way. (See Appendix V for a description of 
Hard Hat.) The value of K in the example calculation above is typical 
of the unshocked. in situ Hard Hat granite. An alternative form of 
Darcy's law for linear .isothermal gas flow follows from continuity of 
mass: 
pQ = const = PoQo (3 ) 
and Boyle's law: 
Po 
= 
P 
= const 
Po P 
(4) 
or 
~-P oQo = PQ = PQ 
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where Q is flow at mean pressure, P :;: 
K :;: or 
Q :;: 
P. + P 
1 0 
2 
Then 
The spherical analyses discussed in Section 5. 1 can be 
concisely summarized by use of the linear version of Darcy's law, 
Equation 5 above. Let D be the distance that gases might penetrate p 
into the rock if the cavity pressure is maintained for a duration, T. 
Also assume the following parameters: 
f :;: porosity :;: .20 
:;: .01 
IIsandstone" 
"granite" 
K :;: permeability :;: 10 mdarcy (both) 
T :;: transientduration :;: 1/3hour 
( 5) 
It is assumed that the rock porosity is available for gas flow, i. e., is 
not occupied by water. One can regard this model in the following way: 
Initially we have a pressurized chamber in the rock, which is losing 
gas by seepage. Gas is introduced into the cavity at the same rate at 
which it is lost through the walls. At time, t :;: 0, a radioactive tracer 
gas is introduced into the chamber. We wish to know how far into 
the rock the radioactivity will have penetrated by a time, t :;: T. The 
average rate of advance of the gas in linear flow in a rock of porosi ty, 
f, is 
v :;: Q f' hence Dp :;: 
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QT 
f 
(6 ) 
The pressure gradient must extend at least as far as D. The reactor p 
cavity pressure is taken as 6 atm, and that at D as 1 atm. Then p 
and 
L = D 
P 
2 1 D = P f 
KT.1P 
f.1 or 
).10-2 (1200) 5 
-2 
D = 2 x 10 p If 
= 120 ern f = 
= 550 ern f = 
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55 
= jf ern 
.20 
. 01. 
(7) 
( 8) 
APPENDIX V 
NUCLEAR TEST EXPERIENCE AT NEVADA TEST SITE 
There are a number of fundamental differences between an 
underground nuclear explosion and the (postulated) release of radioactivity 
from an underground nuclear reactor. Nevertheless, some of the 
experience gained from the underground te st program is applicable also 
to the problem of safety as surance for underground nuclear power plants. 
In the following discussion we begin with a review of the physical 
phenomena involved in the nuclear explosion, with particular attention to 
those shots which were not fully contained. Conclusions drawn from these 
data a re then applied to the problem of containment of the "maximum 
credible accident" (MCA), which is conventionally used to determine 
population exclusion areas for use by the AEC in reactor site evaluation. 
The MCA considered here is specific to water-cooled reactors. Briefly, 
such an accident would occur after a rupture somewhere in the coolant 
system with los s of coolant and subsequent radioactive material releas e. 
Radioactive material is then dispersed in the coolant after melting or rupture 
of fuel elements, the ultimate result being the filling of the vapor contain-
ment ves s el with superheated stearn, gas eous fis sion products, and liquid 
and solid aerosols. 
Experience at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) shows that the depth 
of burial (DOB) required for containment of a nuclear explosion is given 
roughly by D ~ 400 W 1/ 3 where W is yield in kilotons and D is the depth 
of burial (DOB) in feet. It will be seen later that more is involved than 
simple cube-root scaling, but this rule gives an idea of the required 
depths. Hence a 20 kiloton bomb, slightly larger than those used at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II, would be emplaced at about 
1000 feet or more to insure containment. 
Usually the bomb is placed in a small chamber at the bottom 
of a shaft. The shaft is then stemmed with alternating layers of sand and 
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gravel. At detonation, a strong shock is driven into the surrounding rock, 
vaporizing the rock out to a radius of about 20 feet in this example, and 
melting the rock for some distance beyond. This bubble of rock vapor and 
stearn continues to expand for about 100 msec, when the pressure falls to 
approximately the overburden pressure (1 psi for every foot of depth-of-
burial). The cavity radius at this point is about 100 feet. At about this 
time the initial shock reaches the ground surface, and reflects as a 
rarefaction wave. Much of the rock between the shot point and the surface 
is fractured under this initial shock. If the DOB were not sufficient for 
containment, the returning rarefaction would allow further upward growth 
of the cavity, until it reached the surface. Under these circumstances the 
cavity will break the surface to form a crater, releasing some radio-
acti vity to the atmosphere. 
At a depth-of-burial adequate for containment, the cavity 
stabilizes at its final radius, and the returning rarefaction wave is too 
weak, and cavity pressure too low, to cause further growth. At this time, 
the rock vapor has condensed and the cavity is filled primarily with super-
heated stearn, and various non-condensable gases including fission products. 
The cavity may stand for a few seconds, minutes or even hours, but 
eventually it will collapse (there are two known exceptions, both in salt). 
Collapse generally os:;curs only when the cavity pressure has fallen below 
ambient overburden pressures. Upon collapse, the entire ceiling falls 
into the cavity, followed by the progressive collapse of overlying material. 
If the shot medium is rock, the collapse proceeds upward until the cavity 
volume is redistributed throughout a column of rubble with decreased bulk 
density, or until rock is encountered which is sufficiently strong to 
support itself over a span roughly equal to the final cavity diameter. In 
this case a small open cavity may be left at the top of the "chimney, II 
or rubble column. 
The Hard Hat event left a typical cylindrical chimney of height 
350 feet, diameter 140 feet, with a 34-foot void at the top. This event was 
a 5.9 KT yield in granite at a depth of 940 feet. The permeability of the 
rubble was estimated as ~106 darcies. 
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A somewhat different type of collapse occurs in a granular 
medium such as alluvium, in which the bulk density does not change 
appreciably upon collapse. In such media, the entire cavity volume is 
displaced upward upon collaps e, to form a subsidence crater at the surface. 
There are two ways in which radioactivity has been released 
inadvertently from underground tests: prompt venting and seepage. 
Venting is the prompt release (at high pressure) of cavity gases and 
particulate matter through a more or less direct path to the surface. The 
few ventings that have been experienced have usually resulted from 
mechanical failures in stemming or closure devices, especially in tunnels, 
or in line-of-sight pipes leading into the emplacement chamber. 
Seepage is the slow diffusion of the noncondensable cavity gases 
through the chimney rubble. It may begin from within a few minutes to a 
few hours after the explosion, and generally continues for a few hours. 
From August 1963 (when the limited test-ban treaty was signed) 
through the end of 1970, the D. S. conduded 225 underground nuclear tests. 
In 17 events, all at NTS, measurable radioactivity was observed off-site. 
It should be noted that off-site detection generally implies release of 
radioactivity of more than 100 curies. 
Of these 17 tests, 13 fall into the class discussed above in 
connection with venting, and are attributed es sentially to mechanical 
failures and man-made discontinuities in the rock. In at least 3 of these 
events, release occurred through surface ground fissures which were opened 
by the ground shock and apparently intersected either the cavity or the 
stemming. The remaining 4 events involved seepage rather than venting, 
and are not attributable to mechanical failure of closure devices. Seepage 
in these 4 events was not detected until surface-subsidence had occurred. 
This delayed seepage was apparently just the upward diffusion of non-
condensable radioactive gases through the highly permeable chimney rubble 
column, which intersected the surface. 
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The seepage of radioactive gases through the chimney rubble 
column has been studied rather thoroughly. F. W. Aron (Reference V -1) 
has reviewed data from 28 contained events (of yields ranging from I MT 
to a fraction of a kiloton), These data pertain to the height to which 
cavity gases rise in the chimney rubble, and are obtained by post-shot 
drilling. These test holes are drilled vertically or near-vertically down-
ward into the chimney, one object being to determine the amount of rubble 
required to quench the contaminated vapors and to stop the displacement 
and diffusion of the noncondensable gases. The data give either the 
position of the drill bit when radioactivity is first detected, or the position 
of the bit when loss of circulation (LOC) of drill fluid occurs (indicating 
penetration of a highly permeable zone, i. e., the chimney rubble). It 
was found the LOC either occurs above, or at, the level at which 
radioactivity is detected, suggesting that the gases do not always penetrate 
to the top of the rubble chimney. Several factor s act to limit seepage, 
even though the rubble column is usually highly permeable. As already 
noted, the final cavity pressure is primarily due to superheated steam, 
and is somewhat greater than ambient (lithostatic) pressure at the time 
at which the cavity stabilizes. Before collapse occurs, the pressure has 
presumably fallen below ambient, and the filling of the cavity with rubble 
removes more steam by condensation. The gases remaining in the 
rubble can only reach the top of the chimney by a long and tortuous path 
over cool rock surfaces. Iodines are lost by adsorption and settling 
out; the remaining gas is primarily xenon and krypton. The pressure 
(hence seepage rate) of the gas is reduced by heat transfer to the cold 
rubble, and the shorter-lived isotopes decay to solids and settle out. 
(Analysis of these data, Reference V-I) and a review of those 17 events 
which were not contained, show that burial at a depth given by the rule, 
D = 400 W I / 3 is adequate up to about 10 KT and increasingly conservative 
above 10 KT. That is, containment of seepage is not governed by cube-
root scaling. The reason for this is as follows: both the amount of vapor 
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in the cavity, and the volume of the stabilized cavity are proportional to 
yield, hence the final cavity pressure is nearly independent of yield (aside 
from effects of overburden pressure). However, test devices are buried 
roughly according to cube-root scaling; hence the gases from a 1 MT 
bomb, at perhaps twice the initial pressure, must seep 10 times 
(1000 1 /3) as far as those resulting from a kiloton bomb, to escape at the 
surface. Hence the WI /3 rule, while appropriate for avoidance of blast 
cratering, is conservative from the standpoint of containment of seepage 
from the larger bombs. 
For an underground reactor the maximum credible accident 
(MeA) would result in the filling of the reactor chamber (lined with steel 
or concrete) with steam and fission products, at initial steam pressures 
of the order of a hundred psi. Data obtained in the AJAX Nuclear Test 
event seems pertinent. AJAX (11/11/66) was a 6. 5 KT shot at a depth 
of 240 meter s in alluvium (12 % water by weight) at Yucca Flat of the 
Nevada Test Site (NTS). Pressure transducers were placed in a pipe 
extending upward from the working point, yielding cavity pres sure 
measurements from about 15 seconds after zero time until collapse at 
10 minutes. It was estimated that the stabilized cavity held 600 tons of 
steam, at an initial measured pressure of 44 bars. Analysis of the cavity 
pressure history (Reference V -2) indicated that the cavity cooled rapidly 
by heat-transfer to the cavity walls, according to what one would expect 
for the cooling of a body whose thermal conductivity is large compared 
to that of the surroundings. In this case, the temperature history is given 
by: 
where: 
T 
h 
A 
= 
= 
= 
= 
temperature at time t 
surface heat transfer coefficient 
surface area 
heat capacity of cooling mas s 
= total moles steam x molar heat capacity 
Too = ambient temperature 
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Figure V -1 shows the comparison between measured and 
calculated pressures. The pressures are calculated (using the gas law 
to relate P and T) by use of the foregoing equation with the estimated 
values of A and h. The best fit corresponds to a cavity thermal time 
constant: 
T = = 2.8 minutes 
The pressure drop beginning at about 7 minutes corresponds to 
condensation of the steam. Figure V -2 (Reference V -2) shows the 
calculated temperature and phase concentrations in the cavity as functions 
of time. The rate of condensation after 7 minutes implies a very high 
temperature gradient in the cavity walls, which must have spalled and 
flaked into the cavity, increasing the cavity surface area and accelerating 
the rate of cooling. 
The mass of steam in the AJAX cavity (600 tons) is of the 
order of that which could be produced in the MeA for a 1000 MWe reactor, 
and the surface area of the cavity (105ft2) is also comparable to that of 
the corresponding underground reactor chamber. Hence one would expect 
a comparable time constant for the reactor chamber (ignoring any 
provision for steam suppression). 
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APPENDIX VI 
COST DETAIL 
In preparing this report several different plant configurations 
were costed based on the type of reactor, quality of rock, and seisITlic 
loading. Twenty-two separate eleITlents of each plant configuration were 
costed for excavation, concrete lining, and steel liner. The following 
sUITlITlary sheets show the costs for each of these iteITls and the 
excavation-construction subtotals for each configuration and site 
condition. 
VI - 1 
~ 
I 
I\) 
Reactor 
- Instrumentation 
Turbine Gene rater 
Nuclear Auxiliary 
Control and Miscellaneous 
Feed Water Heaters 
Transformer Room 
Cooling Water Tunnels (2) 
Access Tunnel or Shaft 
Control Room Access Tunnel 
Nuclear Auxiliary Access Tunne 
Reactor Access &. Water Tunnel 
Transformer Access Tunnel 
-Reactor Steam Tunnel 
Feed· Water Heater Tunnels 
Reactor Access &. Water Tunnel 
Fuel Transfer Tunnel 
Air Shaft 
Elevator Shafts (3) 
Power In Shaft 
Power Out Shaft 
Fuel Transfer Shaft 
Str. 
Claso 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I~ 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
PWR TYPE RQD= 85 
Net Dimensions Wall - T Excavation Ft Excavation Net Vol. Conc. Vol. 
Vol. Yd 3 Yd 3 Yd 3 
Lit Wit Hft 0 01 Lft Wit Hft 
120 60 135 11/2 4 128 102 146 59943 53104 6839 
30 10 10 
* * 
31 13 12 161 143 18 
355 90 100 3 I 357 117 117 164600 152333 12267 
260 50 90 I 13/4 264 76 98 64005 59486 4519 
230 60 30 11/2 
* 
231 68 41 21640 19671 1968 
100 40 45 1/2 
* 
101 52 51 9165 8823 342 
50 30 50 ~~ 
* 
51 43 54 4095 3952 143 
2000 20 pia 
* * 
46500 43360 3140 
250 40 x 40 I 
* 
14817 14067 750 
200 20 20 
* * 
200 26 23 3959 3747 213 
220 20 20 '.< 
* 
200 26 23 4350 4117 233 
160 30 36 1/2 ,< 160 40 41 8672 8299 374 
80 25 25 ;:~ 
* 
80 32 29 2522 2403 118 
160 10 10 
* * 
160 13 12 828 745 83 
160 14 12 
* * 
160 18 14 2710 2492 218 
80 6 6 
* * 
80 8 7 318 268 50 
160 7 7 
* * 
160 9 9 422 364 58 
250 4 pia 
* * 
100 80 20 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
917 727 190 
250 10 x 10 ;\: 
* 
2750 2180 570 
250 10 Dia 
* * 
733 633 100 
250 10 Dia 
* * 
733 633 100 
250 10 " 10 * * 917 727 190 
TOT LS 414857 382354 32503 
'" minimum liner (4" thick or equiv.) 0, 01, 
roei .. rch thicknee 8 
wall .. rch thic:Ime". 
Exc"vation Cone. a. Ste"l Totel 
Coet $M Surf. Prep. Liner Coet Cost 
Coot $M $M $M 
1.199 .684 1.406 3.289 
.003 .002 - .005 
3.292 1.227 - 4.519 
I. 280 .452 - 1.73Z 
.433 .197 - .630 
.183 .034 - .217 
.082 .014 
-
.096 
.930 .314 - I. 244 
.889 .075 - .964 
.079 .021 - .100 
.087 .023 - .110 
. 173 .037 - .211 
.050 .012 - .062 
.017 .008 - .025 
.054 .022 - .076 
.006 .006 - .01i! 
.008 .006 - .014 
.002 .002 - .004 
.055 .019 - .074 
.165 .057 - .2ZZ 
. (144 .010 
-
.054 
.044 .010 
-
.054 
.055 .019 - .074 
9.130 3.251 1. 406 13.748 
<: 
H 
I 
lAJ 
Reactor 
- Control Drive (2) 
Turbine Gene ratar 
Nuclear Auxiliary 
Control and Miscellaneous 
Feed Water Heaters 
Transformer RODIn 
Cooling Water Tunnels (2) 
Access Tunnel or Shaft 
Control Room Access Tunnel 
Nuclear Auxiliary Access Tunnel 
Reactor Access Tunnel 
Transformer Access Tunnel 
Reactor Steam Tunnel 
Feed Water Heater Tunnels 
Reactor Water Tunnel 
Fuel Transfer Tunnel 
Air Shaft 
Elevator Shafts (3) 
Powe r In Shaft 
Power Out Shaft 
Fuel Transfer Shaft 
Reactor Well 
Str. 
Ca •• 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I~ 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
BWR TYPE - RECONFIGURED ROD 85 
Net Dimensions WaU - T Excavation Ft Excavation Net Vol. Cone. Vol. 
Vol. Yd 3 Yd 3 Yd 3 
Lit Wft Hit D DI Lft· Wit Hft 
155 65 65 2 I 157 83 77 34482 31467 3015 
50 30 40 1/2 
* 
51 41 45 6414 6098 316 
415 100 100 3/4 I 417 127 120 213877 195741 18136 
255 50 90 1 13/4 259 76 98 62803 58364 4440 
320 60 30 1/2 
* 
321 68 41 29820 27171 2649 
100 40 45 1/2 
" 
101 52 51 9165 8823 342 
50 30 50 
* * 
51 43 54 4095 3952 143 
2000 20 Dia 
* 
;,'<: 46500 43360 3140 
250 40 40 1 
* 
14817 14067 750 
200 20 20 
* 
~l~ 200 26 23 3959 3747 213 
220 20 20 ~, 
* 
220 26 23 4350 4117 233 
160 30 36 1/2 
" 
160 40 41 8672 8299 374 
80 25 25 ~ ):' 80 32 29 2522 2403 118 
160 10 10 
* * 
160 13 12 828 745 83 
160 14 12 
* 
,~ 160 18 14 2710 2496 218 
80 6 6 
* 
:0:: 80 8 7 318 268 50 
160 7 7 
* 
-:: 16 9 9 422 364 58 
250 4 Dia 
* * 
100 80 20 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
917 727 190 
250 10 x 10 ;, 
* 
2750 2180 570 
250 10 I ia 
* * 
733 633 100 
250 10 I ia 
* * 
733 633 100 
250 10 x 10 
" * 
917 727 190 
80 65 I ia 1 1 81 67 67 10446 9701 745 
TOT ALS 462350 426163 36193 
• minimum liner (4" thick or equiv.) D. Dl. 
roof arch thiekne •• 
waU arch tMc:kne •• 
Excavation Cone:. &. Stelll Totlll 
Coot $M Surf. Prep. Liner Cost Coat 
Cost $M $M $M 
.690 .302 I. 06Z Z.053 
. 128 .032 - . 160 
4.278 I. 814 - 6.091 
1.256 .444 - I. 700 
.596 .265 - .861 
.183 .034 - .217 
.082 .014 - .096 
.930 .314 - 1. 244 
.889 .075 - .964 
.079 .021 - .100 
.087 .023 - .110 
.173 .037 - .21l 
.050 .012 
-
.062 
.017 .008 - .025 
.054 .022 - .076 
.006 .006 - .012 
.008 .006 - .014 
.002 .002 - .004 
.055 .019 - .074 
.165 .057 - • ZZZ 
.044 .010 
-
.054 
.044 .010 - .054 
.055 .019 
-
.074 
.627 .074 .326 1. 027 
10.498 3.620 1. 388 15.504 
;:1 
I 
..".. 
Reactor 
Turbine Generator 
Nuclear Auxiliary 
Control and Miscellaneous 
Feed Water Heaters 
Transformer Room 
Cooling Water Tunnels (2) 
Access Tunnel or Shaft 
Control Room Access Tunnel 
Nuclear Auxiliary Access Tunnel 
Reactor Access Tunnel 
TransforTI1er Acce ss Tunnel 
Reactor Steam Tunnel 
Feed Water Heater Tunnels 
Reactor Access &: Water Tunnel 
Fuel Transfer Tunnel 
Air Shaft 
Elevator Shafts (3) 
Powe r In Shaft 
Power Out Shaft 
Fuel Transfer Shaft 
Str. 
Cla .. 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
\~ 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
BWR TYPE - MINIMUM MODIFICATION ROD = 85 
Net Dimensions Wall - T Excavation H 
Lit Wft Hft D Dl L ft Wft 
215 75 180 2 7 229 134 
415 100 100 3 3/4 I 417 127 
155 50 90 I 1 3/4 159 76 
245 60 30 I 1/2 
* 
246 68 
100 40 45 1/2 
* 
10 I 52 
50 30 50 
* * 
51 43 
2000 20 Dia 
* * 
250 40 40 I 
* 
220 20 20 
* * 
220 26 
220 20 20 
* * 
220 26 
160 30 36 1/2 * 160 40 
80 25 25 
* * 
80 32 
160 10 10 
* * 
160 13 
160 14 12 
* * 
160 18 
80 6 6 
* * 
80 8 
160 7 7 
* * 
160 9 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
250 10 Dia 
* * 
250 10 Dia 
* * 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
TOT LS 
* minimum liner (4" thick or equiv.) 
Hft 
193 
120 
98 
41 
51 
54 
23 
23 
41 
29 
12 
14 
7 
9 
Excavation Net Vol. Conc. Vol. 
Vol. Yd 3 Yd 3 Yd 3 
184418 158819 25599 
213877 195741 18136 
38774 35926 2848 
23003 20921 2082 
9165 8823 342 
4095 3952 143 
46500 43360 3140 
14817 14067 750 
4350 4117 233 
4350 4117 233 
8672 8299 374 
2522 2403 ll8 
828 745 83 
2710 2492 218 
318 268 50 
422 364 58 
917 727 190 
2750 2180 570 
733 633 100 
733 633 100 
917 727 190 
564871 509314 55557 
D. 
Dl, 
roof arch thickne •• 
wall arch thick"" •• 
Excavation Cone:. &. St .... l Total 
Cost $M Sur!. Prep. Ll""r COit Cost 
Coot $M $M $M 
3.688 2.560 
-
6.248 
4.278 1.814 
-
6.09] 
.775 .285 
-
1.060 
.460 .208 
-
.668 
.183 .034 
-
.217 
.082 .014 
-
.096 
.930 .314 
-
1.244 
.889 .075 
-
.964 
.087 .023 
-
.1l0 
.087 .023 
-
.110 
.173 .037 
-
.211 
.050 .012 
-
.062 
.017 .008 
-
.025 
.054 .022 
-
.076 
.006 .006 
-
.012 
.008 .006 
-
.014 
.055 .019 
-
.074 
.165 .057 
-
.222 
.044 .010 
-
.054 
.044 .010 
-
.054 
.055 .019 
-
.074 
12. 130 5.556 
-
17.686 
<! 
H 
I 
V1 
Reactor 
- Ins trurnentation 
Turbine Generator 
Nuclear Auxiliary 
Control and Miscellaneous 
Feed Water Heaters 
Transfortner Room 
Cooling Water Tunnels (2) 
Access Tunnel or Shaft 
Control Room Access Tunnel 
Nuclear Auxiliary Access Tunne 
Reactor Access Tunnel 
Transformer Access Tunnel 
Reactor Steam Tunnel 
Feed Water Heater Tunnels 
Reactor Access & Water Tunnel 
Fuel Transfer Tunnel 
Air Shaft 
Elevator Shafts (3) 
Power In Shaft 
Power Out Shaft 
Fuel Transfer Shaft 
Str. 
Cla •• 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I II II 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
PWR TYPE ROD 60 
Net Dimensions Wall - T Excavation Ft Excavation Net VoL Cone. Vol. 
Vol. Yd 3 Yd 3 Yd 3 
L ft Wft Hit D Dl L ft Wit Hft 
120 60 135 9 1/4 7 3/4 136 109 161 68840 46073 22767 
30 10 10 ,:~ ~~ 31 13 12 161 118 43 
355 90 100 12 2 3/4 321 121 135 191115 142222 48893 
260 50 90 5 1/2 3 2/3 267 80 107 71887 56050 15837 
230 60 30 4 1/3 3/4 232 69 46 24814 18498 6316 
100 40 45 2 1/3 1/2 101 52 55 9777 8164 1613 
50 30 50 1 2/3 1/2 51 44 57 4279 3562 717 
2000 20 D a 1/2 Y,( 51312 46658 4654 
250 40 x 40 2 1/2 1 252 52 50 21613 17852 3761 
200 20 20 3/4 0' 201 26 24 4086 3451 635 
220 20 20 3/4 221 26 24 4490 3795 694 
160 30 36 1 1/2 3/4 162 41 43 9221 7791 1430 
80 25 25 3/4 'I( 81 32 30 2585 2221 364 
160 10 10 y,~ ", 161 13 12 828 633 195 
160 14 12 0' ~( 161 18 14 2710 2210 502 
80 6 6 ", ':: 81 8 7 318 196 122 
160 7 7 :.:~ ':' 161 9 9 422 284 138 
250 4 Di ", ::( 100 80 20 
250 10 x 10 ':' :>;( 917 727 190 
250 10 x 10 ':' ':: 2750 2180 570 
250 10 I ia ;< ,;, 733 633 100 
250 10 I ia ;;~ ~:, 733 633 100 
250 10 ~ 10 
" 
,< 917 727 190 
TOT ~LS 474608 364758 109851 
---
'" minimum liner (4" thick or equ;v.) D, Dt, 
roof arch thickne •• 
wall arch thick..., •• 
Excavation Cone. &. Steel Total 
Coot $M Surf. Prep. Li...,r Cost Coot 
Coot $M $M $M 
1. 377 2.277 1,406 5.060 
.003 .004 - .007 
3.822 4.889 - 8.711 
1. 438 1,584 - 3.022 
.496 ,632 - 1. 128 
,196 .161 
-
.357 
.086 .072 - . 158 
1. 026 .968 - 1. 994 
1. 296 .376 - 1. 672 
,082 .064 - .146 
,090 ,069 - .159 
.184 .143 - .327 
.052 .036 - .088 
. 017 . 02 - . 037 
.054 .050 - .104 
.006 .012 - .018 
.008 .014 - .022 
.002 .008 - .010 
.055 .039 - .094 
.165 . 117 - .282 
.044 .018 - .062 
.044 .018 - .062 
.055 .039 - .094 
10.598 11. 610 1. 406 23.614 
--_.-
;:i 
I 
0\ 
Reactor 
- Control Drive (2) 
Turbine Generator 
Nuclear Auxiliary 
Control and Miscellaneous 
Feed Water Heaters 
Transformer Room 
Cooling Water Tunnels (2) 
Access Tunnel or Shaft 
Control Room Access Tunnel 
Nuclear Auxiliary Access Tunnel 
Reactor Access Tunnel 
Transformer Access Tunnel 
Reactor Steam Tunnel 
Feed Water Heater Tunnels 
Reactor Water Tunnel 
Fuel Transfer Tunnel 
Air Shaft 
Elevator Shafts (3) 
Power In Shaft 
Power Out Shaft 
Fuel Transfer Shaft 
Reactor Well 
Str. 
Cla .. 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I II II 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
BWR TYPE- RECONFIGURED RQD= 60 
Net Dimensions WaU - T Excavation Ft Excavation Net VoL Cone. Vol. 
Vol. Yd3 Yd3 Yd3 
L ft Wft Hit D DI Lit Wit Hit 
155 65 65 63/4 21/2. 160 86 87 392'63 28770 10492 
50 30 40 1 2/3 3/4 52 42 47 6808 5492 1318 
415 100 100 141/4 23/4 421 131 141 252400 182824 69577 
255 50 90 51/2. 32/3 262 80 107 70534 54956 15578 
320 60 30 41/3 3/4 322 69 46 34237 25746 8491 
100 40' 45 21/3 1/2. 101 52 55 9777 8164 1613 
50 30 50 12/3 1/2. 51 44 57 4279 3562 717 
2000 20 Dia 1/2. :>!~ 51312 46658 4654 
250 40 40 21/2. 1 252 52 50 21613 17852 3761 
200 20 20 2/3 
* 
201 26 24 4062 3455 607 
220 20 20 2/3 
* 
221 26 24 4463 3799 664 
160 30 36 11/2. 3/4 162 41 43 9221 7791 1430 
80 25 25 3/4 ~;, 81 32 30 2585 2221 364 
160 10 10 ~r' ~~ 161 13 IZ 828 633 195 
80 6 6 ~~ :.:' 81 8 7 318 196 122 
160 14 12 
* * 
161 18 14 2710 2210 502 
160 7 7 :,'( ~i: 161 9 9 422 284 138 
250 4 Dia ;l: 
* 
100 80 20 
250 10, 10 
* * 
917 727 190 
250 10, 10 
* 
~'.< 2750 2180 570 
250 10 Dia 
* * 
733 633 100 
250 10 Dia 
* 
~ 733 633 100 
250 10 10 
* * 
917 727 190 
80 65 Dia I 1 10446 9701 745 
TOT LS 531428 409294 122138 
$ minimum liner (4" thick or equiv.) D. Dl, 
roo! arch thicitne •• 
waU arch thie:kruoos 
Excavation Cone:. I< Stu! T@tal 
Cost $M Surf. Prep. Llner Coet Coat 
Coet $M $M $M 
0.785 1. 049 1. 062 2.896 
0.136 .132 
-
.268 
5.048 6.958 - 12. 006 
1.411 I. 558 
-
2.969 
.685 .849 - 1. 534 
.196 .161 
-
.357 
.086 .072 
- · 158 
I. 026 .968 
-
1.994 
1. 296 .376 
-
1. 672 
.081 .061 
- · 142 
.089 .066 
- · 155 
.184 .143 
-
.327 
.052 .036 
-
.088 
.017 .020 
-
.037 
.006 .012 - .018 
.054 .050 
- · 104 
.008 .014 
-
.022 
.002 .008 
-
.010 
.055 .039 
-
.094 
.165 .117 
-
.282 
.044 .018 
-
.062 
.044 .018 
-
.062 
.055 .039 
-
.094 
.627 .107 .326 I. 060 
12. 152 12.871 1.388 26.411 
<: 
H 
I 
-4 
Reactor 
Turbine Generator 
Nuclear Auxiliary 
Control and Miscellaneous 
Feed Water Heaters 
Transformer Room 
Cooling Water Tunnels (2) 
Access Tunnel or Shaft 
Control Room Access Tunnel 
Nuclear Auxiliary Access Tunnel 
Reactor Access Tunnel 
Transformer Access Tunnel 
Reactor SteaITI Tunnel 
Feed Water Heater Tunnels 
Reactor Access & Water Tunnel 
Fuel Transfer Tunnel 
Air Shaft 
Elevator Shafts (3) 
Power In Shaft 
Power Out Shaft 
Fuel Transfer Shaft 
Str. 
Cle .. 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I~ 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
BWR TYPE - MINIMUM MODIFICATION RQD = 60 
Net Dimensions Wall - T Excavation Ft 
L ft Wit Hft D DI Lit Wft Hit 
215 75 180 15 1/3 13 2/3 242 147 220 
415 100 100 141/4 23/4 421 131 141 
155 50 90 5 1/2 32/3 162 80 107 
245 60 30 4 1/3 3/4 247 69 46 
100 40 45 2 1/3 1/2 10 I 52 55 
50 30 50 I 2/3 1/2 51 44 57 
000 20 Dia 1/2 
* 
250 40 40 2 1/2 1 252 52 50 
220 20 20 2/3 
* 
221 26 24 
220 20 20 2/3 
* 
221 26 24 
160 30 36 1 1/2 3/4 162 41 43 
80 25 25 3/4 
* 
81 32 30 
160 10 10 
* * 
161 13 12 
160 14 12 
* * 
161 18 14 
80 6 6 
* * 
81 8 7 
160 7 7 
* * 
161 9 9 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
250 10 Dia 
* * 
250 10 Dia 
* * 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
TOT 1.5 
011 minimum liner (4" thick or equ;v.) 
Excavation Net Vol. Cone. Vol. 
Vol. Yd3 Yd 3 Yd 3 
220550 138436 82114 
252400 182824 69577 
43473 33069 10403 
26384 19706 6679 
9777 8164 1613 
4279 3562 717 
51312 46658 4654 
21613 17852 3761 
4463 3799 664 
4463 3799 664 
9221 7791 1430 
2585 2221 364 
828 633 195 
2710 2210 502 
318 196 122 
422 284 138 
917 727 190 
2750 2180 570 
733 633 100 
733 633 100 
917 727 190 
660848 476104 184747 
D. 
Dl, 
roof arch thickness 
wall arch thickness 
Excavation Cone. II< St.,.,l Total 
Cost $M Surf. Prep. Liner Coot Cost 
Coat $M $M $M 
4.411 8.211 
-
12.622 
5.048 6.958 
-
12.006 
0.869 1.040 
-
1.909 
0.528 0.668 
-
1.196 
0.196 0.161 
-
0.357 
0.086 0.072 
-
0.158 
1.026 0.968 
-
1.994 
1.296 0.376 
-
1. 672. 
0.089 0.066 
-
0.155 
0.089 0.066 
-
0.155 
0.184 0.143 
-
0.327 
0.052 0.036 
-
0.088 
0.017 0.020 
-
0.037 
0.054 0.050 
-
0.104 
0.006 0.012 
-
0.018 
0.008 0.014 
-
0.022 
.055 .039 
-
0.094 
.165 .117 
-
0.282 
.044 .018 
-
0.062 
.044 .018 
-
0.062 
.055 .039 
-
0.094 
14.322 19.092 
-
33.414 
~ 
I 
(X) 
Reactor 
- InstrulTIentation 
Turbine Generator 
Nuclear Auxiliary 
Control and Miscellaneous 
Feed Water Heaters 
Transformer Room 
Cooling Water Tunnels (2) 
Access Tunnel or Shaft 
Control Room Access Tunnel 
Nuclear Auxiliary Access Tunne 
Reactor Access Tunnel 
TransforITIer Access Tunnel 
Reactor Steam Tunnel 
Feed Water Heater Tunnels 
Reactor Access &: Water Tunnel 
Fuel Transfer Tunnel 
Air Shaft 
Elevator Shafts (3) 
Power In Shaft 
Power Out Shaft 
Fuel Transfer Shaft 
Str. 
Cl .... 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I~ 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
1 
'" 
PWR TYPE RQD 40 
Net Dim ens ions Wan - T Excavation Ft Excavation Net VoL Conc. Vol. 
Vol. Yd 3 Yd 3 Yd 3 
L ft Wit Hit D DI L ft Wit Hft 
120 60 135 15 12 2/ 145 119 173 78110 34888 43222 
30 10 10 0- 0- 31 13 12 161 68 93 
355 90 100 193/ 4 1/2 364 124 151 214613 119182 95431 
260 50 90 9 6 272 85 114 79527 49699 29827 
230 60 30, 7 I 1/4 233 70 52 27864 16309 11555 
100 40 45 3 3/ I 102 53 58 10380 7101 3279 
50 30 50 2 2/ I 52 45 59 4489 2951 1538 
000 20 D a I 56316 46542 9773 
250 40 40 4 I 1/2 253 53 53 23131 15946 7185 
200 20 20 I 1/2 201 26 25 4214 2860 1355 
220 20 20 I 1/2 221 26 25 4630 3150 1480 
160 30 36 2 1/ I 162 41 45 9695 6801 2894 
80 25 25 I 1/ ~:~ 81 32 31 2698 1844 855 
160 10 10 ',- "- 161 13 12 828 410 418 
160 14 12 1/ ~, 161 18 15 2768 1630 1138 
80 6 6 ~:" 0- 81 8 7 318 54 264 
160 7 7 :;" :;" 16! 9 9 422 124 297 
250 4 Dia ':" 100 80 20 
250 10 x 10 ':" 0- 917 727 190 
250 10 x 10 7,= :.!' 2750 2180 570 
250 10 Dia ':' 7,: 733 633 100 
250 10 Dia ':( ~:( 7733 633 100 
250 10 x 10 
" 
::( 917 727 190 
TOT LS 526314 314539 211774 
minimum liner (4" thick or equiv.) D. Dl, 
roof a.rch thickness 
waU arch thie:ltne •• 
ExcII.vaU9n Cone:. .. St" .. l Total 
Cost $M Surf. Prep. Li""" Coat Cost 
Coot $M $M $M 
1. 562 4.322 1.406 7.290 
.003 .009 - .012 
4.292 9.543 - 13.835 
1. 591 2.983 - 4.574 
.557 1. 155 - 1. 712 
.208 .328 - .536 
.090 .154 - .244 
I. 126 .977 - 2.103 
I. 387 .719 - 2.106 
.084 .135 - .219 
.093 .148 - .241 
.194 .289 - .483 
.054 .085 - .139 
· 017 · 042 - · 059 
.056 .104 - .160 
· 006 · 026 - · 032 
.008 .030 - .038 
· 002 · 020 - · 022 
· 055 · 079 - · 134 
.165 .237 - .402 
.044 .057 - · 101 
.044 .057 - · 101 
.055 .079 - .134 
II. 693 21. 578 I. 406 34.677 
< H 
I 
'-0 
Reactor 
- Control Drive (2) 
Turbine Generato r 
Nuclear Auxiliary 
Control and Miscellaneous 
Feed Water Heaters 
Transforme r Room 
Cooling Water Tunnels 
Access Tunnels or Shaft 
Control ROOTTl Access Tunnel 
Nuclear Auxiliary Access Tunnel 
Reactor Access Tunnel 
Transformer Access Tunnel 
Reactor Steam Tunnel 
Feed Water Heater Tunnels 
Reactor Water Tunnel 
Fuel Transfer Tunnel 
Air Shaft 
Elevator Shafts (3) 
Power In Shaft 
Power Out Shaft 
Fuel Transfer Shaft 
Reactor Well 
Str. 
Cl ..... 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I~ 
II 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
BWR TYPE-RECONFIGURED RQD= 40 
Net Dimensions WaU - T Exca.vation Ft Excavation Net Vol. Cone. Vol. 
Vol. Yd 3 Yd 3 Yd 3 
L ft Wft H ft D DI L ft Wit H ft 
155 65 145 II 4 163 89 95 43663 24296 19367 
50 30 40 22/3 11/3 53 43 49 72 14 4468 2746 
415 100 100 231/3 42/3 424 134 159 287014 139878 147136 
255 50 90 9 6 267 85 114 78027 48680 29347 
320 60 30 7 11/4 323 70 52 38480 22960 15520 
100 40 45 3 3/4 I 102 53 58 10380 7101 3279 
50 30 50 22/3 I 52 45 59 4489 2951 1538 
000 20 Dia I 56316 46542 9773 
250 40 40 4 1112 253 53 53 23131 15946 7185 
200 20 20 1 112 201 26 25 4214 2860 1355 
220 20 20 1 112 221 26 25 4630 3150 1480 
160 30 36 2112 1 162 41 45 9695 6801 2894 
80 25 25 I 112 81 32 31 2698 1844 855 
160 10 10 161 13 12 828 410 418 
160 14 12 112 ',' 161 18 15 2768 1630 1138 
80 6 6 81 8 7 318 54 264 
160 7 7 ',' 161 9 9 422 124 297 
250 4 Dia ." 100 80 20 
250 10 x 10 ':' ;Ii' 917 727 190 
250 10 x 10 ',' 2750 2180 570 
250 10 Dia ~}: 
* 
733 633 100 
250 10 Dia 
* 
733 633 100 
250 10 10 ',' 917 727 190 
80 65 Dia 11/3 11/3 10656 9835 821 
TOT fl-LS 591093 344510 246583 
• minimum liner (4" thick or equ;v.) D, Dl, 
roof .. rch thickne •• 
w ... ll ... rch thlckne •• 
Excavation Cone:. S. Steel Total 
Coot $M Surf. Prep. Liner Coot Cost 
Coot $M $M $M 
.873 I. 937 1.062 3.872 
.144 .274 
-
.41.8 
5.740 14.714 - 20.454 
I. 561 2.935 - 4.496 
.770 1. 552 - 2.322 
.208 .328 - .536 
.090 .154 - .244 
I. 126 .977 - 2.103 
I. 387 .719 - 2.106 
.084 . 135 - .219 
.093 .148 - .241 
.194 .289 - .483 
.054 .085 - . 139 
.017 .042 - .059 
.056 .104 
-
.160 
.006 .026 - .032 
.008 .030 - .038 
· 002 . 020 - . 022 
· 055 .079 - .134 
· 165 .237 - .402 
.044 .057 - .101 
.044 .057 - .101 
.055 .079 - .134 
.639 .180 .326 I. 145 
13.415 25. 158 1.388 39.961 
~ 
I 
t-' 
o 
Reactor 
Turbine Generator 
Nuclear Auxiliary 
Control and Miscellaneous 
Feed Water Heaters 
Transformer Room 
Cooling Water Tunnels 
Access Tunnel or Shaft 
Control Room Access Tunnel 
Nuclear Auxiliary Access Tunnel 
Reactor Access Tunnel 
Transformer Access Tunnel 
Reactor Steam Tunnel 
Feed Water Heater Tunnels 
Reactor Access &. Water Tunnel 
Fuel Transfer Tunnel 
Air Shaft 
Elevator Shafts (3) 
Power In Shaft 
Powe r Out Shaft 
Fuel Transfer Shaft 
Str, 
Cla .. 
I 
II 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I~ 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
BWR TYPE - MINIMUM MODIFICATION ROD = 40 
Net Dimenoions WaU- T Excavation H 
L ft Wft Hft D Dl Lit Wft Hft 
215 75 180 25 221/l 26'0 165 239 
415 100 100 ~3 1/3 42/3 424 134 159 
155 50 90 9 6 167 85 II4 
245 60 30 7 1 1/4 248 70 52 
100 40 15 3 3/4 1 102 53 58 
50 30 50 22/3 1 52 45 59 
2000 20 Dia 1 
* 
250 40 40 4 I 1/2 253 53 53 
220 20 20 I 1/2 221 26 25 
220 20 20 I 1/2 221 26 25 
160 30 36 2 1/2 1 162 41 45 
80 25 25 1 1/2 * 81 32 31 
160 10 10 
* * 
161 13 12 
160 14 12 1/2 161 18 15 
80 6 6 
* * 
81 8 7 
160 7 7 
* * 
161 9 9 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
250 10 Dia 
* * 
250 10 Dia 
* * 
250 10 x 10 
* * 
TOT \LS 
.. minimum liner (4" thick or equiv.) 
ExcavaUon Net Vol. Conc.Vol. 
'3 Vol. Yd Yd3 Yd3 
258664 113826 144838 
287014 139878 147136 
48027 28280 19747 
29633 17418 12216 
10380 7101 3279 
4489 2951 1538 
56316 46542 9773 
23131 15946 7185 
4630 3150 1480 
4630 3150 1480 
9695 6801 2894 
2698 1844 855 
828 410 418 
2768 1630 II38 
318 54 264 
422 124 297 
917 727 190 
2750 2180 570 
733 633 100 
733 633 100 
917 727 190 
749693 394005 355688 
D. 
Dl. 
roof .... ch thic!me.m 
wall arch thlc:!meG. 
Excav .. tion Cone. a. Steel Total 
Coot $M Surf. Prep. Lll>$r GOlilt Coat 
Coot $M $M $M 
5.173 14.484 
-
19.657 
5.740 14.714 
-
20.454 
.961 1. 975 
-
2.936 
.593 1.222 - 1.815 
.208 .32.8 
-
.536 
.090 .154 
-
.244 
1.126 .977 
-
2.103 
1.387 .719 
-
2.106 
.093 .148 
-
.2.41 
.093 .148 
-
.2.41 
.194 .289 
-
.483 
.054 .085 
-
.139 
.017 .042 
-
.059 
.056 .104 
-
.160 
.006 .026 
-
.032 
.008 .030 
-
.038 
.055 .079 
-
.134 
.165 .2.37 
-
.402 
.044 .057 
-
.101 
.044 .057 
-
.101 
.055 .079 
-
.134 
16.162 35.954 
-
52.116 
APPENDIX VII 
CALIFORNIA COAST SITING 
The location of potential underground power plant sites was 
not included in the s cope of the pres ent study and was not unde rtaken. 
The number and location of suitable sites is, of course, a very 
important question. The following discussion is based upon a 
cursory review of readily available reports and is not presented 
as a complete review of this issue. 
Several areas along the California Coast have been selected 
as potential underground power plant siting areas in the map and 
literature study, "Office Study of Underground Nuclear Power Plant 
Siting Along the California Coast" (Reference VII-I). It should be 
noted that no field investigation has been made and. therefore, 
little is known about the rock material properties in the areas dis-
cussed. The following discussion is extracted from this reference. 
In each case the area is identified by the end points of a segment of 
the coast and the length of the segment. 
One of the better areas appears to be about 10 miles south 
of Monterey between Notley's Landing and Point Lobos. The criteria 
evaluated in Reference VII-l and the corresponding comments include: 
Notley's Landing to Point Lobos State Park - Eight Miles 
1. Zero to three miles from coast: On shoreline. 
2. Located on hard, competent rock: granite block is 
30 to 50 square miles in area. 
3. Only t\yo faults are in the vicinity and these are 
spaced seven miles apart. These faults do not 
appear to be a problem. 
4. Access up to one-half to one mile inland is good 
by way of Highway One. 
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5. Land here is privately owned and theoretically can 
be purchased. 
6. Mos s Landing Power Plant is to the north about 
15 miles with major transmission lines through the 
area by 1990. This area is fairly close to 
San Francis co, a major load center. 
7. The population densi ty of the area is very low, 
though many people use parts of the region for 
recreational purposes. 
8. Granite faces rise from the beach at a rate of up 
to 1,500 feet per mile: more than sufficient to get 
a reasonable ground cover at minimum excavation. 
Santa Lucia quartz diorite and Sur Series metamorphic 
rocks are found in this area. It is an area of homogeneous granite 
with no known faults over a large area. The extent of weatre ring 
is not known. However, the depth of burial of the power plant should 
put the roof of the excavation well into competent rock to provide a 
strong rock arch. This site is probably a dry site with large joint 
spacing and no fracturing. 
An area which may be suitable but less desirable than the 
ab ove area is the Point Arguello site described as follows. 
Point Arguello and Point Pedernales - One Mile 
1. The rock~ being looked at is from three -quarters to 
three miles inland. 
2. The rock type here is rhyolite. It is very possible 
that this is sui table rock. but the depth is not known. 
A closer study should be made of the area. 
3. The Honda Fault runs from one to three miles north 
of the area, but it should not be a problem. 
4. One railroad runs from one-half to three miles from 
the area and an improved light duty road is close by. 
5. This land is privately owned. 
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6. The Mesa Povve r Plant is close to the area and 
the North Coast Power Plant is forecast by 1990. 
7. The population densi ty of this area is low. 
8. The relief of the area is sufficient, but it is situated 
in fairly rugged land. 
Ryolite is an igneous intrusive rock and is similar to granite but 
tends to have finer grains and is more jointed or fractured. Due 
to the jointing and fractures. an underground excavation in this 
area could ei ther be wet or dry depending on the amount of rainfall 
and severity of jointing. If water is encountered, the entire cavity 
may have to be sealed with concrete walls, roof and floor. 
An area of weak rock that might be considered for under-
ground siting lies in the area from Oceanside to San Clemente. It 
is described in the siting report as follows. 
Oceanside to San Clemente - 22 Miles 
1. Geology 
From 8 to 12 miles north of Oceanside there is a 
small four-mile strip of Miocene marine rock that 
has a high possibility of being hard. It should be 
looked into wi th more detail. Around San Clemente 
there are more of the Miocene marine rocks. 
There are few apparent faults in these areas but 
two head for the possible sites and disappear under 
recent sediments. 
2. Access and Terrain 
The potential siting area of this region (8 to 12 miles 
north of Oceanside) is along the beach on the 
San Onofre Bluff with a relief of about 1,000 feet per 
mile. Access in this area is very good. Only in a 
few places is the terrain very rough, and many 
developed roads run clos e by. 
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3. Ownership, Population, and Power Distribution 
The area between Oceanside and San Clemente is 
mainly occupied by Camp Pendleton U. S. Marine 
Corps. 
U. S. Gove rnment owned land is: 
T5W RllSl SB2 
T5W RIOS 
T6W RIOS 
T6W R9S 
T7W R8S 
Population: 
Oceanside 
San Clemente 
Camp Pendleton 
40,686 
16.462 
? 
San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant is located just 
south of San Clemente. 
Main transmission lines from the San Onofre plant 
run north to Los Angeles and south to San Diego. 
This week sandstone may be self supporting for small 
excavations such as small diameter tunnels. However. it is felt 
that any large excavations would have to be lined with a heavy liner. 
Potential Siting Areas in San Diego County 
In addition to the siting areas along the immediate coast 
identified in Reference VII-l there are igneous intrusive masses 
located approximately 3 - 6 miles from the coastline in an area 
from Cardiff-by-the Sea to Camp Pendleton north of Oceanside 
which is approximately 20 miles of ocean frontage. The surface 
geology of some of these areas has been identified by 
Michael P. Kennedy for his doctoral dissertation at the University 
of California. Riverside. On the California State Geology Maps 
scale 1 to 250,000 the rock is identified as Mesozoic granitic rocks 
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such as granite, granodiorite. tonalite and diorite as well as 
Jura-Trias meta volcanic rocks. Mr. Kennedy has identified those 
in the Agua Hedionda area south of Carlsbad as quartz diori te, 
Juras sic metamorphic volcanics and Tertiary andesi teo The 
volcani cs are moderately too highly fractured; however. one outcrop 
of Tertiary andesite which forms the hill Cerro de la Calavera has 
been identified by Mr. Kennedy as very resistant and unfractured at 
the surface. The area at the surface is approximately 1500 feet 
in an east-west direction and 1000 feet in a north-south direction. 
The elevation at the top of the hill is 513 feet above mean sea level. 
A location such as this might provide sufficient area and cover for 
a plant of the size des cribed in this report. This particular location 
is approximately 4-1/2 miles from the coastline in the north 
branch of the Agua Hedionda Canyon. 
The nearest subdivision is approximately 3/4 of a mile 
away. A major transmission line crosses the northern edge of the 
si te leading from the Carlsbad Fossil Fuel Powe r Plant owned by 
San Diego Gas and Electric. Access to the site would be excellent 
by developing existing dirt roads in Agua Hedionda Canyon. It would 
also be feasible to bring a railroad spur from the Santa Fe 
Los Angeles -San Diego main line. These sites in San Diego county may 
merit additional study and investigation along with several of the sites 
mentioned in "Office Study of Underground Nuclear Power Plant 
Siting Along the California Coast. II 
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